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In June 2003, the Supreme Court, in United States v. American Library Ass’n, sent 
tremors through libraries nationwide when it reversed a finding of the United States 
District Court (USDC) in Philadelphia that held the Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA) 
was facially violative of the First Amendment rights of library patrons.  Under CIPA, all 
libraries that accepted federal funding to cover the costs of providing Internet access to 
their patrons were required to install filtering software programs on their computers to 
prevent patrons from seeing any material that was obscene or “harmful to minors.” The 
law was not limited to computers used solely by children – computers used by adult 
patrons, and even staff, were affected. The American Library Association (ALA) had 
objected to CIPA on the grounds that the broad scope of such filtering programs 
prevented patrons from exercising their First Amendment right to see materials which 
were not unlawful, but which the filters prevented them from accessing.   
 
The ALA challenged the constitutionality of CIPA in an action filed in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court, aided by extensive 
evidence developed by expert testimony, and applying a strict scrutiny standard, agreed 
with the ALA and found that CIPA was, on its face, violative of the First Amendment 
rights of library patrons.  The government, utilizing the right, under the Act, to immediate 
appeal to the Supreme Court, sought a reversal of the District Court determination. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that strict scrutiny was not mandated, and 
that CIPA, viewed under an intermediate scrutiny standard, was not unconstitutional on 
its face.  The Court left open the possibility that CIPA might still be overly restrictive as 
applied, meaning that the door was still open for subsequent claims to be brought to 
modify the scope of the statute. 
 
An analysis of this Supreme Court decision is the focal point of this article.  In the first 
section, I look at the history of Congress’ deeply flawed effort to define and regulate 
obscenity in the pre-digital age, and the judicial response to those efforts.  In Section 
Two, the migration of this effort into the digital age is examined, as I review Congress’ 
determined efforts to apply an already flawed standard to the complex universe of 
cyberspace.  Those efforts, found in the Communications and Decency Act (CDA), and 
the Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA), also ran afoul of the Supreme Court and 
were limited or invalidated on overbreadth and First Amendment grounds. The lessons 
learned from these failures give birth to CIPA, and this section includes a summary of its 
relevant provisions. 
                                                          
• Marc H. Greenberg is an Associate Professor of Law and the Director of the JD and LL.M. Program in Intellectual 
Property Law at Golden Gate University School of Law. Professor Greenberg thanks his research assistants, 
Francesca Clough and Christina Sobral, for their invaluable assistance on this article.  
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The Third Section of this article focuses on judicial review of CIPA, beginning with the 
decision in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Fourth Section 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion reversing the District Court and 
upholding CIPA. 
 
The fifth and final section of the article poses the perennial “what next” question.  How 
will libraries respond to the challenge posed by the over- and under-inclusiveness of the 
software filters mandated by CIPA, and is it likely that an “as-applied” challenge to the 






Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and meadows; 
fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of shipping, and the 
waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city… 
 …. 
The raw afternoon is rawest, and the dense fog is densest, and the muddy 
streets are muddiest, near that leaden-headed old obstruction, appropriate 
ornament for the threshold of a leaden-headed old corporation:  Temple Bar.  And 
hard by Temple Bar, in Lincoln’s Inn Hall, at the very heart of the fog, sits the 
Lord High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery. 
 …. 
Never can there come fog too thick, never can there come mud and mire 
too deep, to assort with the groping and floundering condition which this High 
Court of Chancery, most pestilent of hoary sinners, holds, this day, in the sight of 
heaven and earth.1
 
With these immortal words, Charles Dickens, in Bleak House, uses the metaphor of fog 
to begin his scathing critique of the ambiguities and uncertainties lurking in the British probate 
system.  The metaphor applies with equal strength to the decades-old efforts of the U.S. legal 
system to define, and then regulate the distribution of adult-oriented material in popular media.  
It is an effort rife with uncertain definitions, and its vagueness has cost the parties involved their 
reputations, businesses, and more. 
 
The most recent efforts to regulate adult-oriented material have focused on the public 
library system in the United States, and the efforts of that system to provide Internet access to its 
patrons. After two failed legislative efforts to regulate the exposure of children to explicit sexual 
material, Congress finally seems to have met with success in the form of the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act, popularly known as CIPA.2
 
                                                          
1 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE  1-2 (Bantam Classics ed., Penguin Books 1983) (1853). 
2 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2005); 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2005). 
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I. Background: A History of Fog – Obscenity Decisions in U.S. 
Jurisprudence  
 
In order to understand the current cases in which Congress and the Supreme Court are 
attempting to regulate the dissemination of adult oriented material in the online context, we need 
to dial the time machine back to 1957, when in Roth v. U.S.3 the Court first squarely confronted 
the issue of what “obscenity” is. In my review of these early obscenity cases, I was struck once 
again by the verity of the statement attributed to George Santayana, that “those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”4
 
 The defendant in Roth had been convicted for mailing an obscene book and obscene 
circulars and advertising.5  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that this case was the 
first time that the question of whether obscenity was protected speech under the First 
Amendment had been squarely presented to the Court; prior cases had suggested that obscenity 
was not protected speech.6
 
 Based on this history, and noting that “the unconditional phrasing of the First 
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance”7, the Court held that obscenity was not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.8 Justice Brennan was aware that 
there was a fine line to be drawn between material that dealt with sexual matters, and material 
that was obscene. He noted that making this delineation was necessary because of the importance 
of protecting individuals’ right of free speech in all such matters of public concern.9
 
 With these concerns in mind, the Court in Roth spelled out a standard for determining 
whether sexually oriented material was obscene, and therefore devoid of First Amendment 
protection.  The test was “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”10
 
                                                          
3 Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
4 George Santayana, Life of Reason, Reason in Common Sense, SCRIBNERS (1905) at 284. 
5 Roth, 354 U.S. at  481. 
6 Id. at 481 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890); 
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1852), and other citations omitted).  
7 Roth., 354 U.S. at 483. 
8 Id.at 485.  This sweeping pronouncement of the Roth majority forms the basis of obscenity law in the United 
States to this day.  It was accompanied, as is illustrated by the dissenting opinions of Justices Harlan, Douglas and 
Black, with serious concerns over the lack of a clear definition of obscenity, or any agreement as to what community 
would be empowered to create that definition. 
9 Id. at 487. Justice Brennan wrote eloquently that “[s]ex and obscenity are not synonymous...The portrayal of sex, 
e.g. in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection 
of freedom of speech and press.  Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a 
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages;  it is one of the vital problems of human interest and 
public concern.” Id. 
10 Id.at 488. In announcing this test, the Court rejected the early leading standard of obscenity, set forth in Regina v. 
Hicklin, (1868) L.R.3 Q.B. 360, which found material obscene if even an isolated excerpt had a deleterious effect on 
particularly susceptible persons. 
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Citing the instructions of the trial court in Roth, Justice Brennan adopted the trial judge’s 
definition of the community as follows: 
 
The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as 
a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to 
reach.  In other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the 
community….In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are 
the exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in 
determining that conscience you are to consider the community as a whole, young 
and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and irreligious–men, women and 
children.11
 
Determining what the contemporary community standards were in California (where 
Roth was tried and convicted) was no easy task.  The state at that time comprised a diverse 
population, with large concentrations of Mexican and Mexican-Americans in the southern 
portion, and a large population of Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese citizens in the north.  
Liberal politics and social mores were found in San Francisco and Los Angeles, and more 
conservative views were the mainstay of Sacramento and San Diego.  It was, however, an era 
easier to define than contemporary California, since it was a time when commercial air travel 
was in its early stages, television was a nascent industry, and the border-collapsing invention of 
the Internet was a distant dream.  Looking back from our vantage point in history, it seems more 
likely that a jury then, as opposed to now, could come up with a formula that it believed was 
reflective of contemporary community standards.  To attempt that effort now, in an era of 
increased diversity of population and viewpoints, seems an impossibility. 
 
In his dissent in Roth, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, voiced concerns about the 
viability of the “community standard” and about the impact the Court’s ruling would have on the 
First Amendment: 
 
The standard of what offends “the common conscience of the community” 
conflicts, in my judgment, with the command of the First Amendment that 
“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
Certainly that standard would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics, 
politics or philosophy were involved.  How does it become a constitutional 
standard when literature treating with sex is concerned?12
 
 The Roth standard was tested and expanded in the years that followed.  Nine years later, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, acting on its understanding of Roth to mean that a 
patently offensive book that appeals to prurient interest need not be unqualifiedly worthless 
                                                          
11Roth., 354 U.S. at 490 (citing People v. Alberts, 292 P. 2d 90 (Cal. App. Super. 1955)). 
12 Id. at 511-12, 514. Placing his faith in people’s inherent ability to reject meritless material, he concludes:  “I 
would give the broad sweep of the First Amendment full support.  I have the same confidence in the ability of our 
people to reject noxious literature as I have in their capacity to sort out the true from the false in theology, 
economics, politics, or any other field.” Id. at 514. 
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before it can be deemed obscene, found that John Cleland’s 1750 novel, Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure (commonly known as Fanny Hill), was obscene.13
 
 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan found that the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court had misinterpreted the social value criterion of the Roth standard.  
Justice Brennan reiterated that the relevant standard was whether the book was “found to be 
utterly without redeeming social value.”14 Since the courts below had found that the book 
possessed a modicum of social value, reversal was required.15
 
 Faced with the near-impossible task of proving a negative, that a work had to be “utterly 
without redeeming social value”, state court decisions were, in the years following the Memoirs 
decision, routinely appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which found itself in the unenviable role 
of serving as the final board of censorship for the 50 states.  One has to feel a bit sorry for the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, having to review countless alleged obscene works, looking for the 
scrap of social value that might allow them to pass muster as protected works. 
 
 Frustrated by this unworkable standard, the Supreme Court tried again to define 
obscenity in a way that would provide state courts with a viable standard.  This new standard was 
set forth by Chief Justice Warren Burger in the 1973 decision of Miller v. California16, and 
consisted of a three-part test that, despite much criticism, remains the standard today. 
 
 The Miller test imposed the following basic guidelines for the trier of fact: 
 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.17 
 
Acknowledging the difficulties that courts have faced in attempting to articulate a 
workable definition of obscenity,18 Justice Burger asserted that requiring the application of local 
community standards, defined in the opinion as the standards of a given state,19 would “provide 
                                                          
13 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” et. al. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
14 A Book Named , 383 U.S. at 418. 
15 Id. at 420.  Justice Brennan then proceeded to muddy the waters by noting that a book that did have some 
redeeming social value could still be found to be obscene if the circumstances of its production, sale and publicity of 
the book was such that it was commercially exploited purely for prurient appeal. Id. And so the fog gets thicker. 
16 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This was a five-four decision of the Court.  Justices White, Blackmun, 
Powell and Rehnquist joined the majority.  Justice Douglas dissented, and Justice Brennan also wrote a dissenting 
opinion, which was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Id. 
17 Id. at 24.  Justice Burger explicitly rejected the Memoirs requirement that the work be “utterly without redeeming 
social value.” Id.  
18 Id. at 30. 
19 In this case, Justice Burger notes that the applicable community standard was that of “the State of California.” Id. 
at 31. One has to wonder whether the majority of the Justices actually believed that the community standards of such 
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fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring 
prosecution.”20  Justice Burger emphasized that a national standard definition of obscenity was 
not attainable, citing Justice Warren’s Dissent in Jacobellis v. Ohio,21 “I believe that there is no 
provable ‘national standard’…At all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it 
would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one.”22
 
 In a stinging dissent, Justice Douglas attacked the qualifications of the Court to attempt to 
formulate a definition of obscenity as unprotected speech.23  With bluntness tied to considerable 
eloquence, he wrote: 
 
 The Court has worked hard to define obscenity and concededly has failed. 
 …. 
 We deal with highly emotional, not rational, questions.  To many the Song of 
Solomon is obscene.  I do not think we, as judges, were ever given the constitutional 
power to make definitions of obscenity.  If it is to be defined, let the people debate and 
decide by a constitutional amendment what they want to ban as obscene and what 
standards they want the legislatures and the courts to apply.  Perhaps the people will 
decide that the path towards a mature, integrated society requires that all ideas competing 
for acceptance must have no censor.  Perhaps they will decide otherwise. Whatever the 
choice, the courts will have some guidelines.  Now we have none except our own 
predilections.24
 
Justice Douglas got his wish.  With the birth and amazingly swift and widespread acceptance of 
the Internet and World Wide Web as a medium of communication, the U.S. Congress entered the 
debate over the definition of obscenity through a series of attempts to regulate explicit sexual 
material.  Those efforts, rather than clarifying the issues, only brought more fog and murkiness to 
the debate, as illustrated in this next section. 
 
II. Digital Fog – Obscenity Legislation and the Internet 
 
 Over the past 125 years, as each new means for the delivery of entertainment media has 
been developed, from motion pictures to television, from videocassettes to DVDs, enterprising 
entrepreneurs have seized on the new delivery platforms as an opportunity to market adult-
oriented product to an apparently highly interested audience.25  The U.S. Congress, concerned 
about the negative impact this material has on the moral fabric of society, and particularly 
concerned with shielding children from that negative impact, has enacted numerous laws 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
disparate environs as San Francisco and San Diego were considered by the Court as being susceptible to a single 
agreed-upon standard.   
20 Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. 
21 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964). 
22 Id. at 200. 
23 Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-47. 
24 Id. at 37, 46-47. 
25 See infra p. 21 for a discussion of the extent of explicit sexual material found on the Web.  
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prohibiting the trafficking in these materials where they can either be obtained by, or involve the 
use of, children.26
 
 a. The Early Efforts:  The CDA and COPA 
 
 The ubiquitous nature of the Internet and the ease with which children could access the 
numerous adult-oriented entertainment sites online, galvanized Congress into an effort to shield 
children from this material.  Initial efforts to enact protective measures, however, were frustrated 
by successful challenges on First Amendment grounds.  Examples of these efforts are the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)27 and the Children’s Online Protection Act of 
1998 (COPA).28
 
 The CDA was one of the first of these protective measures passed by Congress on 
February 1, 1996, in the nascent era of the Internet and the Web. Section 502(d) of the CDA 
provided, in pertinent part, the following: 
 
(d) Whoever-- 
            (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-- 
                 (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or 
             persons under 18 years of age, or 
                 (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner 
           available to a person under 18 years of age, 
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such 
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or 
          (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's 
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it 
be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
     (e) In addition to any other defenses available by law:29
 
The language of the statute, which describes the content circumscribed by the Act, 
appears borrowed from the Supreme Court’s Miller test, in its reference to “patently offensive” 
content, “as measured by contemporary community standards.”30 Significantly absent, however, 
is the leavening force of the third prong of the Miller test, the question of whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.31 It would appear 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., Karl A. Menninger, Cyberporn:  Transmission of Images By Computer As Obscene, Harmful to Minors 
or Child Pornography, 61 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 51 (2005). 
27 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996). 
28 47 U.S.C. § 231(1998). 
29 47 U.S.C. § 502 (1996), available at http://www.epic.org/free_speech/CDA/cda.html. 
30 See, e.g., the discussion of Miller, supra at 4-6, notes 16-24. 
31 Id. 
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that when it came to protecting children, Congress felt that sexual or excretory, or organ matters, 
however artistic or seriously dealt with, still should be banned.32
 
No sooner had Congress passed the CDA were there strong calls for its repeal.  Eight 
days after its passage, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill to repeal Section 502.33 In his 
Floor Statement on repealing the CDA, Senator Leahy characterized it as “fatally flawed and 
unconstitutional.”34
 
Noting the broad sweep of the Act, and the absence of the important leavening aspect of 
the third prong of the Miller test, Senator Leahy sounded a prescient warning about the danger of 
trying to regulate content on the Internet:   
 
Internet users will have to limit all language used and topics discussed in online 
discussions accessible to minors to that appropriate for kindergartners, just in case 
a child clicks onto the discussion. No literary quotes from racy parts of Catcher in 
the Rye or Ulysses will be allowed. Certainly, online discussions of safe sex 
practices, or birth control methods, and of AIDS prevention methods will be 
suspect. Any user who crosses the vague and undefined line of "indecency" will 
be subject to two years in jail and fines. 
…. 
A few weeks ago, America Online took the online profile of a Vermonter 
off the service. Why? Because the Vermonter used what AOL deemed a vulgar, 
forbidden word. The word -- and I do not want to shock my colleagues -- but the 
word was "breast." And the reason this Vermonter was using the word "breast"? 
She was a survivor of breast cancer. She used the service to exchange the latest 
information on detection of breast cancer or engage in support to those who are 
survivors of breast cancer. Of course, eventually, America Online apologized and 
indicated they would allow the use of the word where appropriate. 
…. 
What strikes some people as "indecent" or "patently offensive" may look 
very different to other people in another part of the country. Given these 
differences, a vague ban on patently offensive and indecent communications may 
make us feel good but threatens to drive off the Internet and computer networks 
an unimaginable amount of valuable political, artistic, scientific, health and other 
speech.35
 
                                                          
32 The author confesses some puzzlement as to whether there exists a body of content which contains patently 
offensive descriptions of excretory functions or of bodily organs separate from any sexual context, a concern 
Congress seems to have felt needed addressing since the language of the Act separates this content from sexual 
content with an “or”. This preclusion also leaves open to question what a jury would use as a reference point to 
determine what the contemporary community standard for non-patently offensive descriptions of excretory functions 
would be. 
33 S. 1567, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996), available at http://www.epic.org/free_speech/CDA/repeal.html. 
34 Communications Decency Act of 1995: Hearing on S.1567 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 




 Congress chose not to heed Sen. Leahy’s call for repeal and his bill was not passed.  
However, within weeks of the passage of the CDA, an action by the American Civil Liberties 
Union was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging 
the constitutionality of the CDA on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.36  The ACLU action 
was followed by a similar filing from the American Library Association, and the two actions 
were joined and proceeded thereafter as a single case.37
 
 The District Court, in a unanimous decision supported by three separate statements by the 
Judges of the Court, struck down the CDA.38  The opinions of the judges all focused on the fact 
that unlike the Miller case, the CDA focused on the term “indecency”, as the Court had defined 
that term in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,39 and Sable Communications v. FCC.40 The three 
judges who made up the District Court panel reviewing the case each wrote separate opinions. 
However, their conclusion that the Act was unconstitutional was unanimous.41   
 
 District Judge Buckwalter found that the word “indecent” in § 223(a)(1)(B) and the 
phrases “patently offensive” and “in context” in §223(d)(1) were so vague that enforcement of 
criminal charges based on these sections would violate the “fundamental constitutional 
principle” of “simple fairness.”42  Similarly, Chief Judge Sloviter found that the statute “sweeps 
more broadly than necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults” and that the terms 
“patently offensive” and “indecent” were “inherently vague.”43
 
 The U.S. government appealed the District Court decision, under Section 561 of the 
CDA’s special review provisions, which allowed the government to bypass appellate level 
review and appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.44  The Court, noting probable jurisdiction, 
accepted the case.45 Oral argument was presented on March 19, 1997, and the Court issued its 
decision on June 26, 1997, in which it affirmed the District Court.46   
 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that the decision of the Court was based 
solely on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, and that although the statute’s vagueness was 
relevant to the First Amendment analysis, the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim was not 
separately addressed by the Court.47
 
                                                          
36 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 
37 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824. 
38 Id. 
39 438 U.S. 726 (1976). 
40 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
41 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824. 
42 Id. at 861. 
43 Id. at 854, 856. 
44 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.  He was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Justice O’Connor filed an opinion in which she concurred in part, and dissented in 
part.  Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Although not a unanimous opinion, this much 
agreement on the part of the Court in a decision relating to obscenity law is a rarity. 
47 Id. at 864-68. 
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 Justice Stevens rejected the government’s argument that the CDA was “plainly 
constitutional” under three prior seminal obscenity decisions, Ginsberg v. New York;48 FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation;49  and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.50 He also strongly rejected the 
government’s assertion that the CDA is “no more vague than the [Court’s own] obscenity 
standard…established in Miller v. California….”51
 
 The CDA does not provide the same protections afforded in the Miller standard, Justice 
Stevens wrote, because it failed to include two key prongs of that test:  “(1) that, taken as a 
whole, the material appeal to the ‘prurient’ interest, and (2) that it ‘lack serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.’”52 Stevens noted that this second prong is important because it is 
not judged by contemporary community standards, thereby allowing appellate courts to “impose 
some limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor 
for socially redeeming value.”53
 
 This analysis led Justice Stevens to conclude that the CDA presented a threat to free 
speech:   
 
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment 
requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.  In order to deny minors 
access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large 
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address 
to one another. 
….  
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in 
protecting children from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an 
                                                          
48 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
49  438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
50  475 U.S. 41 (1986); ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844. Justice Stevens distinguished the CDA from the rationales that 
allowed the Court to uphold convictions in each of these three cases.  Id. at 864-68.  He noted that the statute at issue 
in Ginsberg contained a more narrow prohibition against sales of explicit material, by including the requirement that 
the material at issue be “utterly without redeeming social value,” and that the CDA added an additional year (from 
17 to 18 years of age) to those prohibited from receiving the material at issue. Id. at 865-66. He noted further that the 
CDA fails to define “indecent’ and “importantly, omits any requirement that the patently offensive material covered 
by §223(d) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 865.  Moving on to the FCC v. Pacifica 
case, the Court distinguishes it by noting that the Pacifica case limited the times when indecent material could be 
broadcast over the radio; a medium that could only be afforded “limited First Amendment protection . . . because 
warnings could not . . . protect listeners from unexpected program content.”  Id. at 867.  The Court noted the District 
Court findings that the Internet had “no comparable history,” and that persons seeking to access material online had 
to take “a series of affirmative steps” to reach it, as opposed to merely turning a dial. Id.  Finally, the Court 
distinguished the Renton case, noting the purpose of the zoning ordinance was to prevent the so-called “’secondary 
effects’…of crime and deteriorating property values” that allegedly would plague neighborhoods where adult 
theaters and similar businesses were allowed to operate. Id. Acknowledging that cyberspace might be a sort of 
neighborhood, the Court nonetheless found that the CDA, with its prohibition against “indecent” speech, was a 
“content-based blanket restriction on speech,” instead of a “time, place and manner” form of regulation. Id. at 867-
68.  
51 ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872. 
52 Id.at 873. 
53 Id.  It is significant to note that Justice Stevens did not follow this characterization of the value of this prong of the 
Miller test with any citations to cases that subsequently established this “national floor for socially redeeming 
value”. There is little evidence to suggest that this optimistic goal was ever achieved. 
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unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.  As we have 
explained, the government may not “reduce the adult population … to … only 
what is fit for children.”54
 
 In her concurrence and dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the majority opinion went 
too far in its determination that the CDA is facially overbroad and vague.55 She agreed that to the 
extent the CDA was, in her view, “little more than an attempt by Congress to create ‘adult zones’ 
on the Internet,” that it failed because there was inadequate screening technology in 1997 to 
screen out only minors from viewing content.56  Justice O’Connor also argued that there was no 
showing by the plaintiff that the CDA burdened a substantial amount of material with some 
redeeming value for minors, and that the CDA’s ban on the communication of obscene material 
from an adult to a minor, where the minor’s status is known to the adult, should have been 
upheld by the Court.57
 
 The relatively quick challenge and subsequent invalidation of the CDA’s effort to restrict 
allegedly harmful online content sent Congress back to the drawing board for another attempt to 
craft legislation that would pass constitutional scrutiny.  The result of this second effort was the 
enactment of the Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA).58
 
 Mindful of the concerns with unconstitutional overbreadth that plagued the CDA’s 
attempt to address online content, the Congress fashioned COPA in a manner intended to comply 
with the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the Reno v. ACLU decision.  The House 
Report that accompanied the legislation outlined the purpose of COPA and the effect the prior 
ruling had on its creation: 
 
The purpose of H.R. 3783 is to amend the Communications Act of 1934 by 
prohibiting the sale of pornographic materials on the World Wide Web (or the 
Web) to minors.  H.R. 3783 has been carefully drafted to respond to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) and the Committee 
believes that the bill strikes the appropriate balance between preserving the First 
Amendment rights of adults and protecting children from harmful material on the 
World Wide Web. 
 
H.R. 3783 prohibits a person from knowingly making, by means of the 
World Wide Web, any communication for commercial purposes that is harmful to 
minors, unless such person makes a good faith effort to restrict access by 
minors.59
                                                          
54 ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874-75 (citation omitted). 
55 Id. at 886-97. 
56 Id. at 886-87. Justice O’Connor’s view of the limits imposed by technology foreshadow the Court’s subsequent 
determination that CIPA is not unconstitutionally overbroad, based on the perception of the Court that by 2004, the 
technology of screening had advanced to the point that these concerns were no longer valid.  The accuracy of that 
perception will be discussed. Id.  
57 Id. at 896-97. 
58 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998). 
59 TOM BLILEY, CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 5 (1998).  The Report notes that the Act 
gives examples of what would constitute a good faith effort to restrict access to minors – citing “the use of a credit 
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 The ACLU viewed the terms of COPA with the same skepticism it had for the CDA 
provisions and, in early 1999, launched a similar immediate constitutional challenge.  The case 
was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 
included, as plaintiffs, an array of different organizations representing booksellers and other 
media organizations.60  The ACLU and the other plaintiffs sought an injunction barring 
enforcement of COPA on the grounds that it abridged the free speech rights of adults.61  The 
District Court agreed and issued the injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail at 
trial in establishing that COPA was content-based regulation on sexual expression that was 
presumptively invalid, subject to strict scrutiny, and was not the least restrictive means of 
preventing access by minors.62
 
 Attorney General Reno appealed the District Court’s ruling.63 To the government’s 
dismay, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, based on an entirely 
different line of reasoning.64  The Court of Appeals found that COPA’s use of the Miller case’s 
“contemporary community standards” test to identify material harmful to minors rendered the 
Act substantially overbroad because it was impossible, from a technology standpoint, for Web 
publishers to limit access to their sites based on the geographic location of particular Internet 
users.65 This analysis highlights a conflict between the nature of the Internet, and the keystone of 
the Miller decision – how can you determine the contemporary community standards of Web 
users, who come from all over the country and the world?  The Miller standard’s reliance on the 
geographic boundaries of a local community has no meaning in the boundlessness of cyberspace. 
 
 The Supreme Court disagreed.  In May 2002, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ 
decision and remanded the case to the District Court.66 The decision by the Supreme Court 
reflects seriously conflicting viewpoints by the justices over the meaning and applicability of the 
amorphous Miller case phrase “contemporary community standards.”67  The only point a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number.”  The Report notes that the Act 
“requires providers of interactive services to notify customers that parental control protections, such as computer 
hardware, software, and filtering services, are commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access 
to material that is harmful to minors….”  The Act also “establishes a Commission on Online Child Protection that is 
required to study technological and other methods to help reduce access by minors to material that is harmful to 
minors on the Internet.” Id. at 6. 
60 ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493-97 (E.D. Pa.1999). This case is also referred to in subsequent decisions 
as Reno II. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 175. 
66 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).   
67 Id. at 566  A detailed paragraph was required to identify the split of views of the members of the court, thusly:   
THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to 
Parts I, II, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C.J. and O’CONNOR, SCALIA and BREYER, JJ., joined, an 
opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which REHNQUIST, C.J. and O’CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, 
and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A, III-C, and III-D, in which REHNQUIST, C.J. , and SCALIA, J., 
jointed.  O’CONNOR, J., and BREYER, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment.  KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER and 
GINSBURG, JJ., joined.  STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 565. 
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majority of the Court was able to agree on was that COPA’s use of this standard to determine if 
material is harmful to minors does not, on its face, violate the First Amendment.68  Since the 
Court’s discussion on this issue will reappear in a slightly different context in the CIPA case that 
is the focus of this article, it warrants careful examination. 
 
 Justice Thomas began the analysis by acknowledging the Court of Appeals’ concern that 
the community standards test may not apply to the Internet because Web publishers have no 
technological ability to limit the geographic territories in which their content may be viewed. He 
carefully parsed the language of the Miller case, noting that the Court’s standard allowed 
communities to define “community” by use of a precise geographic area, such as the State of 
California, or a less precise phrasing, such as “contemporary community standards.”69  In the 
latter case, he acknowledged that the standard the jurors would apply “will inevitably draw upon 
personal ‘knowledge of the community or vicinage from which he comes.’”70 The government 
acknowledged in their brief that even if jurors in a COPA case were instructed to apply the 
standard of the adult population as a whole, “the variance in community standards across the 
country could still cause juries in different locations to reach inconsistent conclusions as to 
whether a particular work is ‘harmful to minors.’”71
 
 Acknowledging that this kind of inconsistency is troubling, Justice Thomas noted that 
COPA attempts to make up for the potential uncertainty by adding the “serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value for minors” standard and that the material, to be subject to the Act, 
must be designed to appeal to the prurient interest of minors.72 He noted that the Court had held 
that where these added standards are present, “we have held that requiring a speaker 
disseminating material to a national audience to observe varying community standards does not 
violate the First Amendment.”73
 
 Justice Thomas noted that Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens questioned the 
applicability of those “community standards” prior decisions to the Internet, but disregarded this 
concern by suggesting that if this poses a problem for a publisher, the solution is to abandon the 
Internet and choose a medium with geographic controls:   
 
The publisher’s burden does not change simply because it decides to distribute its 
material to every community in the Nation.... If a publisher wishes for its material to be 
judged only by the standards of particular communities, then it need only take the simple 
                                                          
68 ACLU, 535 U.S. at 566. 
69 Id. at 576 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 453 (1974)). 
70 Id. at 577 (citing Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974)). 
71 Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 39).   
72 Id. at 578-579. 
73 Id. at 578-580.  Justice Thomas relies here on the previously cited case of Hamling, 418 U.S. at 453, and on Sable, 
492 U.S. at 115. It should be noted however, that neither of these cases dealt with online communications, Hamling 
dealing with transmittal of obscene material through the mail, and Sable with so-called “dial-a-porn” telephone 
systems.  As other members of the Court note, these cases may not be dispositive in the Internet context, since the 
purveyors of the material at issue in those cases had the ability to limit distribution to different geographic sectors, 
an ability Web operators lack. 
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step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into those 
communities.74
 
 Based on this analysis, Justice Thomas summed up the Court’s decision by noting that 
the decision only addressed the error of the Court of Appeals’ finding that COPA’s reliance on 
community standards does not by itself render the statute unconstitutional.  The Court expressed 
no opinion on the merit of the District Court’s finding that the Act suffered from constitutional 
overbreadth and would not survive strict scrutiny. The Court remanded the case to the District 
Court for further proceedings.75
 
 In her partially concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor urged the Court to set aside the 
concerns previously voiced in Roth, Jacobellis, and Miller, regarding the impossibility of 
adopting a national standard, and suggested that such a standard should now be adopted for the 
regulation of obscenity on the Internet.76 It appears that she came to this conclusion because she 
recognized that since Web publishers can’t control the geographic locations in which their 
content can be viewed, they are likely to engage in suppression of otherwise allowable speech.  
Her solution, though, to adopt a national standard, did not offer any real assistance since the 
same or an even greater degree of variance, despite her claim to the contrary, is likely to be the 
result. Her efforts to convince her colleagues of this view rang hollow, and it feels as if she is 
also trying to convince herself as well: 
 
If the Miller Court believed generalizations about the standards of the people of 
California were possible, and that jurors would be capable of assessing them, it is 
difficult to believe that similar generalizations are not also possible for the Nation 
as a whole.  Moreover, the existence of the Internet, and its facilitation of national 
dialogue, has itself made jurors more aware of the views of adults in other parts of 
the United States.  Although jurors asked to evaluate the obscenity of speech 
based on a national standard will inevitably base their assessments to some extent 
on their experience of their local communities, I agree with Justice B[reyer] that 
the lesser degree of variation that would result is inherent in the jury system and 
does not necessarily pose a First Amendment problem.77
 
 The unanswered question that follows from Justice O’Connor’s analysis is that if jurors 
are going to apply their experience in their local communities, then how is the standard, as 
applied, a “national” one?  The further question of what criteria are applied to determine what 
the “national standard” is in a given case is also not answered.  A third question that arises is that 
if a publisher distributes material in hard copy as well as online, will the same material be subject 
to two different standards, a local community standard for the hard copy, and a national standard 
for the online material?  This issue is not addressed. 
 
                                                          
74 ACLU, 535 U.S. at 583. Justice Thomas claims that, contrary to the views expressed by Justice Kennedy and 
Justice Stevens, COPA does not foreclose an entire medium of expression, it only requires that material potentially 
harmful to minors be placed behind adult identification screens.  Id. at 584 n.14.  Easier said than done, since such 
screens are trivially circumscribable. 
75 ACLU, 535 U.S. at 585-586. 
76 Id. at 586. 
77 Id. at 589. 
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 Issues not addressed by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals are the 
motivating force behind the separate concurrence of Justice Kennedy, whose viewpoint was 
shared by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy began by noting that the District 
Court may have been right in determining that COPA is overbroad, and as a content-based 
regulation it was presumptively invalid and an abridgement of free speech.78
 
 Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Thomas’ suggestion that publishers should simply 
find another medium, noting that “laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression” pose a 
danger to free speech.  Zeroing in on the “community standards” debate, he rejected Justice 
O’Connor’s national standard proposal, noting:  “The national variation in community standards 
constitutes a particular burden on Internet speech”.79 He also sounded a note of concern that the 
use of a national standard would allow forum shopping in Internet cases, since there is some 
uncertainty whether a Web site moves “through” a number of different communities.80 As he 
pointed out, this could give the government the opportunity to choose the forum for bringing an 
action, and for that reason, the Court of Appeals was right to consider the community standards 
issue: 
 
The more venues the [g]overnment has to choose from, the more speech will be chilled 
by variation across communities….The Court of Appeals was correct to focus on the 
national variation in community standards, which can constitute a substantial burden on 
Internet communication; and its ultimate conclusion may prove correct.81
 
 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, was more direct.  Citing the result in the first ACLU v. 
Reno case regarding the CDA, he reminded the Court that it previously held that community 
standards, as applied to the Internet, created an overbreadth problem.82 In a pointed footnote, he 
also reminded the Court that although it had not held that applying a national standard to 
obscenity cases was constitutionally impermissible, “we have said that asking a jury to do so is 
‘an exercise in futility.’”83
 
 On remand to the Court of Appeals, focusing this time on the same overbreadth of the 
Act that motivated the District Court to issue injunctive relief, the Court reaffirmed its prior 
determination that COPA violated the First Amendment.84 The Court of Appeals considered 
whether other less restrictive means of shielding minors from harmful material existed.85 One 
alternative method it considered was the use of blocking and filtering software programs.86 The 
Court noted that the District Court had also considered this option, and had concluded that 
                                                          
78 ACLU, 535 U.S. at 591.  
79 Id. at 596-597.  
80 Id. at 602. 
81 Id. Ultimately, Justice Kennedy concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding that COPA could be enjoined 
simply because it included the community based standard. Id. at 598.  While agreeing that this might prove to be a 
valid basis for concern, he came down in favor of simply remanding the case for further analysis of the Act, with the 
instruction that the lower court should consider the community standard issue as part of its overbreadth and 
vagueness analysis. Id.  
82 Id. at 606. 
83 Id. at 607 n.3. 




although filtering and blocking software was imperfect, it would be at least as successful as 
COPA in restricting minors’ access to harmful material. It would also impose less of a burden on 
constitutionally protected speech than the Act imposed on adult users.87
 
 In response, the government argued that filtering software was not a viable means of 
preventing access by children to harmful material, and that COPA was a much more effective 
tool.  The Court describes the three problems the government ascribed to filtering software: 
 
The [g]overnment offers the following three reasons for this conclusion:  (1) filtering 
software is voluntary – it transfers the burden of protecting children from the source of 
the harmful material, i.e. the Web publishers, to the potential victims and their parents; 
(2) filtering software is often both over- and underinclusive of targeted material; and (3) 
it is more effective to screen material “prior to it being sent or posted to minors” on the 
Internet.88
 
 The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that these arguments had some merit, 
concurred with the District Court’s view that blocking and filtering techniques, despite their 
weaknesses, were at least less restrictive than COPA in achieving the Act’s goal of preventing 
minors’ access to harmful material.89 On the way to reaching this conclusion, the Court had to 
reconcile this view of filtering software with the decision of a three-judge Pennsylvania District 
Court in American Library Ass’n. v. U.S..90 In that decision, which is discussed in detail in 
Section III of this Article, the panel struck down the Children’s Internet Protection Act’s (CIPA) 
requirement that all public libraries receiving government funding for computers and Internet 
access must install filtering and blocking software on all computers in the library. The three-
judge panel found that this requirement violated the First Amendment rights of library patrons.91  
 
 The Court of Appeals in ACLU v. Ashcroft distinguished the decision in American 
Library Ass’n v. U.S. by noting that unlike CIPA, it was not proposing the mandatory use of the 
software, and that voluntary use was therefore not as burdensome on free speech, particularly 
when compared with COPA’s broadly sweeping provisions.92 The Court also noted that CIPA’s 
method for allowing adults to gain access to blocked sites, the “disabling provision”, which 
required adults to identify themselves to librarians in order to disable a filter and therefore gain 
unlimited access to online material, created a “chilling effect” on their free speech, and that the 
remedy they were proposing as an alternative to COPA, did not contain this provision.93
  
  
                                                          
And so, this second Congressional effort to prevent minors from accessing Internet-based 
material harmful to them was rejected by the judiciary.94  Congress, however, is not so easily 
87 ACLU, 322 F.3d at 261-262 (citing Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497). 
88 Id. at 262 (citing the Government’s Brief on Remand at 47). 
89 Id. at 265. 
90 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
91 Id. at 406, 411. 
92 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 264-65. 
93 ACLU, supra note 66, at 264-265.  The Court also noted that despite the problems inherent in filtering technology, 
they present a reasonable choice for parents and teachers whose high priority was on preventing exposure of harmful 
material to minors. Id. at 265. 
94 ACLU, 322 F.3d at 243, 271. 
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deterred, and before the final ruling in the ACLU v. Ashcroft was issued, Congress had once 
again passed legislation aimed at limiting minors’ access.95  This time, Congress reined in their 
sights, and focused on an area that their budget power reached – access to the Internet on 
government-funded computers in public libraries. 
 
b. The Third Strike:  Congress Adopts CIPA 
 
 This new statute was known as the Children’s Internet Protection Act, or CIPA.96 The 
August 1999 Senate Report detailing the terms of the bill creating CIPA explained that the 
purpose of the bill was “[t]o protect America’s children from exposure to obscene material, child 
pornography, or other material deemed inappropriate for minors while accessing the Internet 
from a school or library receiving Federal Universal Service assistance for provisions of Internet 
access, Internet service, or internal connection.”97
 
 The “Federal Universal Service” referred to in the bill is a subsidy that was added by 
Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  It is commonly referred to as the Schools 
and Libraries Discount, or E-rate, and is a 2.25 billion dollar subsidy to assist schools and 
libraries with the costs associated with connecting those institutions to the Internet.98   In 
addition to the E-rate program, libraries also receive subsidies for Internet access via the Library 
Services and Technology Act (“LSTA”).99
  
 Concerned that federal dollars may be providing a means for children to access the many 
dangerous websites on the Internet, which the Senate Report described as including child 
pornography, pedophilia sites, and sites which promote hate, illicit drug use and bomb-making 
information, CIPA was intended to prevent access to this kind of material in public schools and 
libraries, by requiring that all computers in those institutions, as a condition of obtaining E-rate 
and LSTA subsidies, must install filtering and blocking software packages.100
 
 As valid as the concern of sheltering minors from this material may be, there are 
troubling economic and social manipulation issues posed by this legislation.  Recent surveys 
reflect that more than 60% of the households in American contain Internet connections.  Many 
schools and universities now require students to have Internet access to take advantage of web-
enhanced courses or to conduct research.  For the vast majority of the middle and upper class of 
                                                          
95 CIPA’s provisions are found in two federal statutes;  47 U.S.C. § 254(l) (2005).; 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2005). 
96 47 U.S.C. § 254(l) (2005); 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2005). 
97 S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 1 (1999). The Senate Report, citing the March 4, 1999 testimony of Mary Anne Layden 
Ph.D., Director of Education for the Center of Cognitive Therapy, at the University of Pennsylvania, before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, quoted her view that “The Internet presents a unique threat 
to normal sexual development in children by playing upon common elements that contribute generally to antisocial 
behavior in children. ‘Research indicates that there are three factors that produce the best environment to stimulate 
antisocial behavior in children; it is the combination of anonymity, role models of behavior and arousal.  Internet 
Web sites possess exactly these three factors.’” Id. at 3, n.7. The Senate Report does not discuss or address other 
environments that include these factors – the author suggests that movies, cable television, explicit musical lyrics, 
drive-in theaters, and high school classrooms and social activities would also meet this description. 
98 Id. at 2.  The Senate Report notes that there are approximately 86,000 public schools and 9,000 public libraries in 
the United States, all of which are eligible to participate in the E-rate program. Id., at 2, 10-1. 
99 20 U.S.C. § 9101 et. seq. (2005). 
100 S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 3-6 (1999). 
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the United States, computer and Internet savvy is a given aspect of their lives, and it is rapidly 
becoming a necessary tool in business and society in general.   
 
 However, the Information Superhighway often is just an off-ramp to a dead end for the 
less fortunate citizens in the United States.  For those children of families of modest means, the 
cost of a personal computer and Internet access is beyond those means.  For those children, 
access to a computer and the Internet may only be found in their schools or public libraries.  Yet 
the effect of legislation like CIPA restricts what those students will see to only those sites 
deemed by the producers of the filtering and blocking technology as “appropriate” for them.  The 
Act does not attempt, nor does any other legislation, to shield children who have private 
computers from accessing these allegedly harmful sites.  In essence then, a side effect of CIPA is 
to create a two-tier system of access to Web sites for citizens in the United States – filtered and 
blocked Internet access for the poor, and full access for the rich.101
 
 Anticipating the First Amendment arguments that would follow the imposition of 
mandatory filtering in America’s public libraries and schools, the Senate Report noted the 
compelling government interest in protecting children from harmful influences, and set the stage 
for a significant argument in the ensuing litigation: whether public schools or libraries are public 
forums, since if they are, any content-based restriction affecting them would be subject to strict 
scrutiny First Amendment analysis; and if they are not, intermediate scrutiny will be the relevant 
standard. 102
 
 The Senate Report also focused on the right of Congress, in a spending bill, to require, as 
a condition for receipt of a Federal subsidy, measures to restrict children’s access to harmful 
material.  The Report cited Supreme Court decisions in Rust v. Sullivan103 and National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley104 as precedent to support conditioning receipt of Federal 
assistance on compliance with the filtering and blocking software requirement.  Congress 
indicated its belief that it had successfully addressed the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
                                                          
101 There is an interesting historical parallel here.  The first laws restricting obscenity came into existence concurrent 
with the development of the printing press, which in turn allowed for dissemination of books to the middle and 
lower classes.  Pornographic books had long been in circulation to the wealthy, who were the only ones who could 
afford them or who had received reading instruction, with no restriction on the content of those books. 
102 S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 7-9.  The Senate Report cites Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 482 U.S. 260 
(1988),  in support of the view that schools are non-public forums that are outside the general marketplace of 
expression.  For libraries, the Report appears to be on shakier ground, with the only authority cited being Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), wherein the Court held that libraries are “a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, 
and to beauty.”  Id. at 142.  The authors of the Report assert that libraries are not public forums because they require 
patrons to maintain quiet, and note that “[P]atrons are not permitted to give speeches, make public statements, sing, 
speak loudly.  Further, patrons at a library do not have the right to make editorial decisions regarding the availability 
of certain material”.  S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 7. No authority is offered in support of these claims regarding the 
nature of libraries, and it would appear that this is a broad generalization of questionable accuracy.  For example, 
while it may be true that the reading rooms of most libraries are places of quiet, many libraries also feature 
community-meeting rooms where members of the public engage in all of the activities associated with public forums 
and for First Amendment activities.  The lack of evidentiary support regarding these claims becomes significant as 
we will see, infra, that these same claims are adopted without investigation, by the majority of the Supreme Court in 
the subsequent litigation over the constitutionality of CIPA. 
103 S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 8 (citing 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). 
104 Id. (citing 524 U.S. 569 (1998)).   
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concerns by noting:  “In sum, the Committee is confident that the approach of S. 97 to schools 
would survive any constitutional challenge brought in Federal court”.105
  
 The net effect of CIPA was to require all public schools and libraries receiving E-rate 
subsidies, to install and operate filtering or blocking technology on computers when in use by 
children.  The Act does not allow libraries to designate specific computers for use by children. 
Instead it requires that all computers be filtered and blocked.106  What about adult users?  CIPA 
provides that “[a]n administrator, supervisor, or other authority may disable a technology 
protection measure under paragraph (1) to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful 
purposes.”107
 
 This “disabling” provision is troubling in the extreme – it poses far more problems than it 
purports to solve.  The provision is silent as to what standard the “administrator, supervisor or 
other authority” is to use in determining whether a patron’s request to disable the filter is for 
“bona fide research or other lawful purpose”, an omission which gives the person with control 
over the computer discretion to determine the rights of adult patrons to access online content.108  
Additional privacy issues are posed by this provision – in a large city, the relative anonymity of 
library patrons provides some shield on this issue – but the small town library does not.  Instead, 
we are left with the image of a well known citizen of the small town having to ask the librarian to 
disable the filter in order to allow the patron to access sites dealing with breast cancer, or penile 
dysfunction, both sites likely to trigger sensitive filtering software. 
 
 CIPA’s disabling provision is also silent regarding technological and logistical challenges 
posed by its terms.  It requires librarians to train personnel on how to disable the filters, and 
poses such questions as whether the disabling is limited to a specific site, or will result in 
disabling the entire filter.  If the former, it will be unpopular and burdensome on both patrons 
and staff if research in a filtered area requires multiple requests for disabling the filter.  If the 
latter, disabling the filter in general for a patron invites the same problems of access of 
inappropriate material that CIPA is intended to prevent.  Moreover, once the filter is disabled, the 
patron and staff must remember which computers have disabled filters, and to renew the filter 
before the next patron uses the computer.  For a major metropolitan library, which may have a 
substantial number of computers available for the public, this provision poses a logistical 
nightmare. 
 
 CIPA also came equipped with enforcement provisions.  Libraries that fail to certify the 
presence of filtering and blocking software on all of their computers are required to reimburse 
the telecommunications carrier that provided their Internet access with the amount of the 
discounted rates they received under the E-rate system. 109
 
                                                          
105 S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 8. 
106 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2005). 
107 Id. § 9134(f)(3) (2005).   
108 Id. 
109 S. REP NO. 106-141, at 19. 
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 Like the previous attempts at limiting online access to prevent children from receiving 
harmful material, CIPA garnered an immediate legal challenge.  The first stage of that challenge 
was in the District Court, and is the focus of the next section. 
 
III. The District Court Decision:  A Sunny Day  
 
 The challenge to CIPA was filed by an assortment of plaintiffs, including the American 
Library Association as lead plaintiff.110 Following an expedited but extensive discovery 
schedule, the District Court conducted an eight-day trial, in which the parties presented 
testimony from 20 witnesses, and provided the court with numerous deposition transcripts, 
stipulations and documents.  The principal focus of the trial was on the viability and capacity of 
the filtering and blocking software programs available at the time – which goes to the heart of 
the CIPA requirements.111
 
 The Court produced an extraordinary opinion at the conclusion of the trial, comprising 71 
pages, of which it devoted 30 pages to summarizing the extensive findings of fact derived from 
the expert testimony and related documents presented on the filtering technology issue.112  The 
balance of the opinion dealt with the appropriate level of scrutiny CIPA was subject to, either 
strict scrutiny or the “rational basis” standard; and the related issue of whether public libraries 
are public forums in a traditional or new sense; and whether the filtering and blocking software 
required by CIPA was narrowly tailored to meet the government’s objectives, or whether less 
restrictive alternatives existed, mandating a determination that the statute was overbroad.113
 
 The Opinion began with the Court’s Preliminary Statement, in which it summarized the 
grounds advanced by the plaintiffs in support of a desired finding that CIPA is facially 
unconstitutional.  Plaintiffs alleged that CIPA required libraries to give up their patrons’ First 
Amendment rights as a condition of receiving federal funds, an impermissible requirement under 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.114 The gravamen of this argument was that, given the 
limits of filtering and blocking software, CIPA’s insistence on this technology being installed on 
all library computers resulted in content-based restrictions of patrons’ access to what is otherwise 
constitutionally protected speech. The Court noted that plaintiffs contended that content-based 
restrictions such as are found in CIPA are subject to review under a strict scrutiny standard 
because libraries are public forums, and such restrictions are only allowable if they are narrowly 
                                                          
110 Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  The plaintiffs comprise 
representatives of public library associations, including the California Library Association, the New York Library 
Association and the Wisconsin Library Association, as well as individual city and county libraries in Norfolk, 
Virginia; Santa Cruz, California; and the Multnomah County Public Library in Oregon.  Individual plaintiffs 
included Emmalyn Rood, a sixteen-year-old user of the Multnomah County Public Library who had difficulties 
researching information regarding her sexual identity, finding that library blocking software prevented her from 
accessing sites regarding gay and lesbian issues, and Mark Brown, who in accessing the Internet at the Philadelphia 
Free Library did online research regarding breast cancer and reconstructive surgery for his mother who had breast 
surgery.  Web publisher plaintiffs included Afraid to Ask, Inc., which maintains a free health education website, and 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., which also maintains several free websites that provide a range of 
information about reproductive health.  
111 Id. at 407-08. 
112 Id. at 401-472. 
113 Id. at 408-11. 
114 Id. at 407 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). 
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tailored to further a compelling state interest and no less restrictive alternatives would further 
that interest. 115  Plaintiffs’ further grounds included the argument that CIPA   
 
imposes an unconstitutional condition on public libraries by requiring them to relinquish 
their own First Amendment rights to provide unfiltered Internet access as a condition of 
their receipt of federal funds…that CIPA is facially invalid because it effects an 
impermissible prior restrain on speech by granting filtering companies and library staff 
unfettered discretion to suppress speech before it has been received by library patrons and 
before it  has been subject to a judicial determination that it is unprotected under the First 
Amendment. Finally, plaintiffs submit that CIPA is unconstitutionally vague.116
 
 After summarizing the statutory framework of CIPA and the nature of the various 
plaintiffs in the case,117 the Court provided a detailed summary of the workings of the Internet, 
the size and scope of websites found online, and the amount of sexually explicit material on the 
Web.118 Although the Court noted that recent estimates put the number of sexually explicit 
online content at only 1-2% of the total content on the Web, given the size of the Web this 
translates to more than 100,000 sites offering free sexually explicit material, and many more fee 
or subscriber based sites with this type of content.119
 
 The Court’s next focus was on the delivery of Internet access by U.S. public libraries to 
citizens.  The Court found that approximately 95 of all public libraries provided public access to 
the Internet.120 This access is hugely popular, and greatly expands the amount of information 
available to library patrons.  In many ways, it provides a tremendous benefit, particularly to 
public libraries in smaller cities or economically depressed areas, since it allows a library to 
provide a vast amount of material without significantly increasing the acquisition budget of the 
library.  The Court noted that over a fifth of the Internet users with low (under $15,000) 
household family incomes use their public library for Internet access.121
 
 The Court’s findings also provided a detailed analysis of the diverse range of approaches 
libraries have taken in creating “acceptable use” policies governing patrons’ use of the 
                                                          
115 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 407. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 837 (1995); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)). 
116 Id. n.1 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); City of Chicago v. Morales, 
527 U.S. 41 (1999)). 
117 Id. at 411-17. 
118 Id. at 417-19.  The Court notes that as of September 2001, over 400 million people, 143 million in the U.S.A., 
were using the Internet worldwide. Id. at 416. Much of the content on the Web is not publicly available, and 
therefore is not indexable, making it difficult to determine the true size of the Web. Id. at 419. The Court cites a 
2000 study that estimated a total of 7.1 million unique Web sites, which by September 2001 would likely number 11 
million sites. Id.  Extrapolating further, this would suggest that by the date of this writing, in July 2005, the number 
would have grown to approximately 25 million sites. The Court also cites estimates that the Web is growing at a rate 
of approximately 1.5 million Web pages per day, and that at least 2 billion Web pages are theoretically reachable by 
standard search engines. Id. 
119 Id. at 419.  The Court notes that an additional problem with these sites is that some of them can be accessed 
accidentally, or contain innocuous names that can cause a Web surfer to unintentionally encounter sexually explicit 
material, a problem exacerbated by mouse-trap style pop-ups that make it difficult to exit a page that is accessed.  Id. 
120 Id. at 422 (citing John C. Bertot & Charles R. McClure, Public Libraries and the Internet 2000:  Summary 
Findings and Data Tables, Report to the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science, at 3).  
121 Id.  
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Internet.122 Some libraries limit such policies to sexually explicit materials, whereas others apply 
their policy to a broader range of materials, including those found “harmful to minors,” 
“offensive to the public,” “racially offensive,” or those found to simply be “inappropriate.”123  
 
 Enforcement of these policies has led libraries to develop a variety of approaches, 
broadly organized into four categories:  (1) channeling patrons’ Internet use; (2) shielding other 
patrons from seeing what a Web surfer is viewing; (3) locating computer screens in a manner to 
allow librarians to see what a surfer is viewing, allowing the librarian to employ “tap on the 
shoulder” enforcement as to inappropriate material; (4) employing filtering or blocking 
software.124
 
 The development of this range of alternative approaches supports the view that regulating 
online content viewing in public libraries is a problem perhaps best addressed through a “local 
community standard,” since each library is uniquely equipped to understand the needs and 
sensitivities of the community they serve. Given the diverse nature of communities nationwide, 
great caution should be observed before attempting to adopt a national approach to this issue – a 
caution acknowledged by the District Court in this case.125
 
 The Court noted that a significant issue presented by blocked or filtered Internet access 
was the privacy and embarrassment factors that are presented when patrons must ask a librarian 
to unblock a site or page. These findings are summarized as follows: 
 
It is apparent that many patrons are reluctant or unwilling to ask librarians to unblock 
Web pages or sites that contain only materials that might be deemed personal or 
embarrassing, even if they are not sexually explicit or pornographic. We credit the 
testimony of Emmalyn Rood, discussed above, that she would have been unwilling as a 
young teen to ask a librarian to disable filtering software so that she could view materials 
concerning gay and lesbian issues.126
 
 The Court next reviewed the state of Internet filtering technology. The opinion devoted 
twenty-three pages to an exhaustive analysis of the viability and problems with the application of 
this technology to use in public libraries providing Internet access.127
 
                                                          
122 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
123 Id. In some cases, the Court notes, libraries have imposed use policies precluding patrons from using library 
Internet terminals for receiving personal email, or playing games, or participating in chat rooms.  Id.  
124 Id. at 424-27.  The Court notes that all of these techniques have their supporters and detractors.  Privacy screens 
make it difficult for more than one person to see what is on the screen, which makes assisting patrons in need of help 
challenging;  the “tap on the shoulder” practice is distasteful to many librarians, who do not want to risk a possible 
confrontation with a patron; and filtering and blocking software is often over- or under-inclusive. It is this concern 
that likely explains the very limited use (only about 7% of libraries) of filtering software in public libraries before 
CIPA. Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 427.  The Court cites further findings indicating that very few unblocking requests are received by counties 
that use blocking and filtering technology – not because of a lack of desire for access – but because patrons are 
reluctant to ask that sites be unblocked. Id. 
127 Id. at 427-50. 
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 The analysis began by explaining that the major purveyors of this software create control 
lists of hundreds of thousands of Universal Resource Locator (URL) sites, divided into numerous 
text-based categories, which then are submitted to the filtering and blocking program, and sites 
whose URL’s have been identified as containing the text listed within these categories, are 
blocked from a patron’s view. The evidence submitted to the Court focused on the three major 
products on the market which were currently in use in public libraries - SurfControl’s Cyber 
Patrol, N2H2’s Bess/12100, and Secure Computing’s SmartFilter – each of which have control 
lists containing between 200,000 and 600,000 URLs.128
 
 Of considerable significance are the technological limitations of these products.  The 
court noted that none of the category definitions used in these products were identical to CIPA’s 
definitions of visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors.129  
Further, none of these category definitions made any attempt to incorporate local community 
standards, a very troubling omission given the significance the Supreme Court had attached to 
this standard in the determination of legal obscenity.130
 
 A second significant technological weakness in these products is their inability to identify 
and block or filter sites based on visual images.  These products only search and identify 
offending URLs based on text.  So, if a Web site contains graphic visual depictions of a sexually 
explicit nature, but no text is included on the pages, it will sail right past the filter unless the site 
is also reviewed by a human employee of the software company.  The Court noted that this was 
not a problem likely to be solved in the near term:  “Image recognition technology is immature, 
ineffective, and unlikely to improve substantially in the near future.”131
 
 A third technological limitation is the practice of categorizing Web sites based on what is 
know as the “root URL” of the entire site.  The example cited by the Court was the practice of 
blocking all of the content on the Playboy Web site because the Root URL was categorized as 
Adult, Sexually Explicit, or Pornography, despite the fact that many pages on the site may 
contain content that is not sexual in nature, such as the celebrity interviews, or articles relating to 
historical or political events.132
 
 Two human factors also are found by the Court to add to the problems of using filtering 
and software technology:  the proprietary nature of the lists of blocked URLs, and the inability to 
re-review blocked sites and pages due to the sheer number of new pages (1.5 million per day) 
that are added to the Web.133  The Court noted that since the manufacturers of these software 
products considered the actual lists of URLs blocked under their categorization regimes to be 
                                                          
128Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 427-28.  The Findings noted that these companies use  30-40 broad 
categories of URLs to be blocked.  Examples include Adult/Sexually Explicit; Glamour & Intimate Apparel; Nudity; 
Sex; Pornography, etc. 
129 Id. at 429. 
130 Id. at 429.  The Court notes further that no judicial determination is involved before these products categorize a 
Web site.  Additionally, the Court notes that none of the filtering companies trains its reviewers in the legal 
definitions of obscenity, or makes any effort to incorporate any determination of local community standards into its 
categorization or review processes. Id. at 433. 
131 Id. at 431. 
132 Id. at 433-434.  Apparently the application of the Root URL method renders the time-worn rationalization of 
Playboy subscribers, “I only read it for the articles,” ineffective. 
133 Id. at 408, 430. 
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proprietary in nature, it was more difficult to determine if those sites contained protected 
speech.134  
 
 The second factor, the lack of a re-reviewing practice, is even more troublesome.  Many 
Web sites are dynamic, meaning that the content on their pages is changed frequently.135  If an 
entire site or even discrete pages are blocked once, they stay blocked in that software program 
unless specifically reviewed and the blocking is released.136  Additionally, URLs are often 
abandoned and reassigned to new owners, who may substitute content, with the result that a 
blocked site that formerly contained objectionable content may no longer present that content.137 
However, it will remain blocked by one or more of the filtering software companies’ product 
simply because no one knew it was blocked initially, and no re-review takes place.138
 
 Based on their exhaustive analysis, only a portion of which is summarized herein, the 
Court concluded that under CIPA, not only is the dirty bathwater of pornographic material 
thrown out by the filtering software, but the baby is too – in the form of significant amounts of 
protected free speech: 
 
Nonetheless, out of the entire universe of speech on the Internet falling within `the 
filtering products’ category definitions, the filters will incorrectly fail to block a 
substantial amount of speech.  Thus, software filters have not completely eliminated the 
problems that public libraries sought to address by using the filters, as evidenced by 
frequent instances of underblocking. 
…. 
Even more importantly…we find that commercially available filtering programs 
erroneously block a huge amount of speech that is protected by the First Amendment.  
Any currently available filtering that is reasonably effective in preventing users from 
accessing content within the filter’s category definitions will necessarily block countless 
thousands of Web pages, the content of which does not match the filtering company’s 
category definitions, much less the legal definitions of obscenity, child pornography, or 
harmful to minors. 
…. 
…Many erroneously blocked pages contain content that is completely innocuous for both 
adults and minors, and that no rational person could conclude matches the filtering 
companies’ category definitions, such as “pornography” or “sex.” 
…. 
No presently conceivable technology can make the judgments necessary to 
determine whether a visual depiction fits the legal definitions of obscenity, child 
pornography, or harmful to minors.  Given the state of art in filtering and image 
recognition technology, and the rapidly changing and expanding nature of the Web, we 
find that filtering products’ shortcomings will not be solved through a technical solution 
in the foreseeable future.139
                                                          
134 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 429-430. 
135 Id. at 408 
136 Id. at 435. 
137 Id. at 435-436. 
138 Id. at 435-436. 
139 Id. at 448-449. 
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 The Court next turned to the merits of the plaintiffs claim that CIPA was facially invalid 
and violated the First Amendment rights of the libraries and their patrons.140 The strength or 
weakness of that claim depended in significant part on the outcome of the analysis of 
constitutional limitations on Congress’ exercise of the spending power.141 Based on the fourth 
prong of the standard set forth in Dole,142 plaintiffs argued that the “First Amendment ‘provides 
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds’ created by CIPA.”143 In considering 
this argument, the District Court noted that the general rule that a “court may sustain a facial 
challenge to a statue only if the plaintiff demonstrates that the statue admits of no constitutional 
application”144 was subject to an exception in cases dealing with First Amendment 
overbreadth.145 In the case where a statute burdens a “substantial amount of protected” speech, 
facial invalidation was permissible, “even if the statute may be constitutionally applied in 
particular circumstances.”146
 
 The District Court also acknowledged that the parameters of this First Amendment 
exception to the facial challenge standard presented somewhat of a moving target for lower 
courts in view of disparate Supreme Court opinions in Rust v. Sullivan147and NEA v. Finley.148  
These cases first present a tougher standard, and then a more liberal standard for the application 
of the exception.149
 
 Given the somewhat ambiguous jurisprudence regarding this exception, the District Court 
adopted the more restrictive standard - for CIPA to fail, the libraries must show that compliance 
with the statute would necessarily violate the First Amendment.150 Despite the adoption of this 
tougher standard, the District Court noted that compliance with CIPA does in fact violate the 
First Amendment “[b]ecause of the inherent limitations in filtering technology, public libraries 
can never comply with CIPA without blocking access to a substantial amount of speech that is 
                                                          
140 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
141 Id.at 450.  The Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) provides the standard for 
analysis of spending power issues.  “In Dole, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute requiring the 
withholding of federal highway funds from any state with a drinking age below 21.”  Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 
211-12).  The Court set forth four general constitutional limits on Congress’ use of the spending power:  1) “the 
exercise must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”Id. at 207; 2) “any conditions that Congress sets on states’ 
receipt of federal funds must be sufficiently clear to enable recipients ‘to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant 
of the consequences of their participation.’” Id.; 3) “the conditions on the receipt of federal funds must bear some 
relation to the purpose of the funding program.” Id.; and 4) “other constitutional provisions may provide an 
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.” Id.  The Court in Dole explained this last limitation as 
precluding the use of the spending power “to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconsititutional”. Id. at 210. 
142 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
143 American Library Ass’n, Inc., 201 F. Supp.2d at 448-449. 
144 Id. at 451, (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 
(1988)). 
145 Id. at 451-452. 
146 Id.at 452, (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 612 (1973)). 
147 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
148 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
149 See supra notes 118-119. 
150 American Library Ass’n., 201 F.Supp. 2d at 453. 
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both constitutionally protected and fails to meet even the filtering companies’ own blocking 
criteria.”151
 
 This conclusion led the District Court to next consider the government’s argument that 
the appropriate level of scrutiny of CIPA’s limitations on protected speech was rational basis 
review, and the plaintiffs’ argument that as a content-based limitation, CIPA was subject to strict 
scrutiny. The outcome of this argument determined whether the government would be required 
to show that CIPA was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest and that 
no less restrictive alternatives would further that interest, or whether CIPA need only be 
reasonable, that the government’s interest that the restriction serves need not be compelling, the 
statute need not be narrowly tailored, and that it need not be the most reasonable or the only 
reasonable limitation.152  
 
 The answer to this question required the District Court to next consider where libraries fit 
under public forum doctrine, since the government’s power to limit speech on its own property is 
dependent on the nature of the forum the government has created.153 If the restriction is applied 
to an area less amenable to free expression, such as a military base or a jail, First Amendment 
considerations are less stringently applied154 Conversely, if the government property is a public 
street, sidewalk or park, restrictions on protected speech are subject to strict scrutiny.155
 
 Applying these principals to the public libraries provision of Internet access to patrons, 
the District Court noted further that the relevant forum is “not defined by the physical limits of 
the government property at issue, but rather by the specific access that the plaintiff seeks” – 
which in this case means that the Court is not to examine the entire library, but only the Internet 
access provided by the library, in determining what kind of fora is involved.156
 
 The first stage of this inquiry required a discussion of what is the purpose of a public 
library.  In Perry, the Court held that the purpose of a public library is “for use by the 
public…for expressive activity.”157 The government response to this question was to note that 
public libraries routinely make decisions limiting the content of their collection, and that such 
decisions are not subject to strict scrutiny, nor should they be.158 In support of this argument the 
government cited the decisions in Rust and Finley, for the principle that the government may 
make a decision to fund a particular viewpoint it seeks to advance, without necessitating a level 
of scrutiny beyond rational basis.159
                                                          
151 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 453. 
152 Id. at 454, (citing United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)). 
153 Am. Library Ass’n., 201 F.Supp. 2d at 454. 
154 Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)). 
155 Id. The Court notes that public streets, sidewalks and parks are deemed traditional public fora, and are contrasted 
with designated (or limited) public fora, defined as public property that the state has opened for use by the public as 
a place for expressive activity, ie: school board meetings. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs. Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).  Finally, the Court identified the third tier of fora as being nonpublic fora, which consists of 
all remaining public property. Id. 
156 Id. at 455-456. 
157 Id. at 457 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).   




 In Rust, for example, the Court upheld viewpoint-based funding, noting “[w]hen 
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to 
adopt democratic principles, 22 U.S.C. §4411(b), it was not constitutionally required to fund a 
program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and 
fascism.”160
 
 This principal was strengthened in the Finley case, in which the Court upheld the right of 
the National Endowment for the Arts to condition its grants on a judgment it reserved as to the 
artistic merit of submissions.  In support of its ruling, the Finley Court noted:  “The very 
assumption of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according to the artistic worth of 
competing applications, and absolute neutrality is inconceivable.”161
 
 Based on these authorities, it would seem at first impression that the conditional grant of 
funds must allow the government broad latitude to impose content-based restrictions.  The 
District Court in American Library Ass’n. v. U.S. disagreed, distinguishing Rust and Finley by 
noting that:  
 
The more broadly the government facilitates private speech, however, the less deference 
the First Amendment accords to the government’s content-based restrictions on the 
speech that it facilitates.  Thus, where the government creates a designated public forum 
to facilitate private speech representing a diverse range of viewpoints, the government’s 
decision selectively to single out particular viewpoints for exclusion is subject to strict 
scrutiny.162
 
 In sum, the District Court concluded: “Thus, we believe that where the state designates a 
forum for expressive activity and opens the forum for speech by the public at large on a wide 
range of topics, strict scrutiny applies to restrictions that single out for exclusion from the forum 
particular speech whose content is disfavored.”163
 
 It is at this point that the District Court confronted a central tenet in the government’s 
argument: if we agree that public libraries have the power to limit their collection of books, and 
that challenges to those limitations must proceed on a rational basis level of scrutiny, Internet 
access limitations in a public library must be judged by the same standard.  The District Court 
considered this argument, and rejected it, noting that in the traditional library screening process, 
staff review and select the books based on a determination of the needs of the community, 
whereas the Internet provides a vast amount of material, which no one person could ever review 
and select from: 
 
Nonetheless, we disagree with the government’s argument that public libraries’ use of 
Internet filters is no different, for First Amendment purposes, from the editorial discretion 
                                                          
160 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
161 Id. at 459 (citing NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (the Court upheld the right of the NEA to award grants to 
artists based on a determination of artistic excellence)). 
162 Id. at 460. 
163 Id. at 461. 
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that they exercise when they choose to acquire certain books on the basis of librarians’ 
evaluation of their quality.  The central difference, in our view, is that by providing 
patrons with even filtered Internet access, the library permits patrons to receive speech on 
a virtually unlimited number of topics, from a virtually unlimited number of speakers, 
without attempting to restrict patrons’ access to speech that the library, in the exercise of 
its professional judgment, determines to be particularly valuable.164
 
 This analysis focused on the flaw in the argument that using filters to block or limit 
Internet content accessible by patrons is no different than the selectivity librarians’ exercise in 
choosing which books to purchase for the library collection.  The difference is found in the 
nature of the Internet – with over 2 billion pages available, and over 1.5 million added daily, it is 
simply impossible for mechanical filters, or human reviewers working for filtering or blocking 
software manufacturers, to review and delete material allegedly obscene or harmful to minors 
without at the same time preventing access to vast amounts of protected speech.  Neither the 
technological nor the human means exist to effectively perform this selection function. Given the 
significant role libraries play as a “mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas,”165 the 
District Court was reluctant to sanction the broad use of this technology mandated by CIPA.166
 
 While also acknowledging that the Internet is not a traditional example of public fora, the 
Court found that the Internet does share many of the characteristics of streets, sidewalks and 
parks as loci for free expression.167 In fact, these traditional fora suffer from geographic 
limitations not present in online expression and communication – you can only physically 
address a limited number of people in the park or on the street – whereas an unlimited number 
can be reached via cyberspace, through the use of chat rooms, message boards and free Web 
hosting services.  Moreover, Internet access in public libraries also serves the role of making the 
digital highway a road accessible for all, eliminating the off-ramps and dead ends that poverty 
mandates for those unable to afford private Internet access.168 The District Court summarized its 
finding that Internet access in public libraries, as public fora, require that any statute that 
attempts to restrict that access be subject to strict scrutiny, as follows: 
 
In short, public libraries, by providing their patrons with access to the Internet, have 
created a public forum that provides any member of the public free access to information 
from millions of speakers around the world.  The unique speech-enhancing character of 
Internet use in public libraries derives from the openness of the public library to any 
member of the public seeking to receive information, and the openness of the Internet to 
any member of the public who wishes to speak. 
 …. 
A faithful translation of First Amendment values from the context of traditional 
fora such as sidewalks and parks to the distinctly non-traditional public forum of Internet 
                                                          
164 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 834 (1995)). 
165 Id. at 466 (citing Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F. 2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976)). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 467. 
168 Id. (citing National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Falling Through the Net:  Defining the Digital Divide (1999), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/contents.html). 
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access in public libraries requires, in our view, that content-based restrictions on Internet 
access in public libraries be subject to the same exacting standards of First Amendment 
scrutiny as content-based restrictions on speech in traditional public fora such as 
sidewalks, town squares, and parks.169
 
 The District Court’s determination that strict scrutiny must be applied to CIPA’s 
mandated restrictions on Internet access next required the Court to review the statute to see 
whether (1) there was a compelling government interest that the use of filtering software 
promotes; (2) the use of filtering software under CIPA was narrowly tailored to further that 
interest; and (3) whether less restrictive alternatives existed that would promote the 
government’s interest.170
 
 The Court found no difficulty in determining that the government’s stated interest in 
preventing the dissemination of obscenity, child pornography and material harmful to minors 
was a legitimate state interest, particularly given the possibility that library patrons, either those 
using the libraries’ computers to surf the Internet, or those merely passing by the computers, 
might also be unwillingly exposed to offensive material. The Court found that this legitimate 
interest could be served by filtering software that prevented access to those materials.171
 The Court next considered whether CIPA’s requirement that all library computers be 
equipped with filtering or blocking software was narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate state 
interest. Here CIPA ran afoul of the limits of technology.  The Court found: 
 
The commercially available filters on which evidence was presented at trial all  block 
many thousands of Web pages that are clearly not harmful to minors, and many 
thousands more pages that, while possible harmful to minors, are neither obscene nor 
child pornography….Given the substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech 
blocked by the filters studied we conclude that use of such filters is not narrowly tailored 
with respect to the governments’ interest in preventing the dissemination of obscenity, 
child pornography, and material harmful to others.172
 
The Court found that CIPA resembled the Communications Decency Act, and noted that 
the CDA had been found to be facially invalid due in part to limitations in the available 
technology to determine the age of Internet surfers.  These similarities were summarized as 
follows: 
                                                          
169 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 470. The District Court, in making this determination, reflects its 
awareness that we live in a new age of communication, and that the traditional places of interchange of human ideas 
have been replaced in many respects, by cyberspace.  The Court acknowledges that this transition has not passed the 
notice of the Supreme Court either, as is reflected by the following quote:  “Indeed, ‘[m]inds are not changed in 
streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping 
of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media.’” Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03 (1996)). 
170 Id. at 471. 
171 Id. at 475.  The Court did not, however, accept the idea that filters were the appropriate way to deal with 
inappropriate behavior of patrons whose computer use in the library focused on viewing obscene or otherwise 
inappropriate material.  The Court observed that the examples of behavior cited, such as masturbation or abusive 
behavior towards staff or other patrons, were best dealt with through education and punishment for violations of the 
law, rather than limiting the rights of all patrons to view otherwise protected speech. Id. at 474-75. 
172 Id. at 475-76. 
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Similarly, although on its face, CIPA, like the CDA, requires the suppression of only 
constitutionally unprotected speech, it is impossible as a practical matter, given the state 
of the art of filtering technology, for a public library to comply with CIPA without also 
blocking significant amounts of constitutionally protected speech.173
 
 Turning to the third prong in the strict scrutiny analysis, the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives, the District Court found that the numerous other less restrictive methods public 
libraries had employed before the enactment of CIPA, including privacy screens, the “tap on the 
shoulder” method, and post-use review and warnings of suspension of access privileges, were all 
at least as effective in meeting the government’s interest in limited minor’s access to harmful 
material.174 Based on this finding, the Court concluded that the “government had failed to show 
that the less restrictive alternatives…are ineffective at furthering the government’s interest.”175
 
 In an effort to rebut the lack of narrow tailoring argument, the government argued that the 
disabling provisions of CIPA cured the tailoring defect. The District Court rejected this 
argument, noting that the statute’s disabling provision, which allowed library staff to disable the 
filtering software for an adult patron, “to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful 
purposes,”176 was vague and would likely deter many patrons, particularly “those who have 
sensitive positions.”177 The District Court also noted that the disabling provision also present 
timing problems since in some libraries, response times to requests for disabling the filters could 
take days, which in turn imposed a serious burden on patron’s use of the Internet.178
 
 Having conducted this exhaustive review of the technological and legal barriers to CIPA, 
the District Court concluded as follows: 
 
In view of the severe limitations of filtering technology and the existence of these less 
restrictive alternatives, we conclude that is it not possible for a public library to comply 
with CIPA without blocking a very substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
speech, in violation of the First Amendment.179
 
The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that CIPA was facially 
invalid under the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement.180 This carefully 
drafted decision represents a bright burst of sunlight in the often-murky fog of obscenity law.  
However, off the coast, fog was gathering.  The government took an immediate appeal of the 
decision, and the ultimate fate of CIPA was placed in the hands of the Supreme Court. 
 
                                                          
173 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 478. The Court employed a colorful turn of phrase in describing the effect 
of CIPA:  “Where the government draws content-based restrictions on speech in order to advance a compelling 
government interest, the First Amendment demands the precision of a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.” Id. at 479. 
174 Id. at 481. 
175 Id. at 484.   
176 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2005). 
177 Am. Library Ass’n., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486. 
178 Id. at 487-88. 
179 Id. at 490. 
180 Id. at 496. 
 30
IV. The Fog Returns: The Supreme Court Decision  
 
 In an opinion marked by fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Internet, and 
with little regard to past Supreme Court obscenity law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
reversed the District Court decision.181 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the four-judge 
plurality, began the Opinion with several questionable assertions of fact, which become critical 
to the merits of the legal principals subsequently based on those assumptions. 
 
 At the outset, Justice Rehnquist, quoting from various sources who provided data to the 
Congressional hearings regarding the enactment of CIPA, opined that the accessibility for library 
patrons of pornography on the Internet is a “serious” problem, noting that one source collected 
over “2000 incidents of patrons, both adults and minors, using library computers to view online 
pornography, including obscenity and child pornography.”182  Since this is the principal evidence 
cited by the plurality as indicative of the severity of the problem, and given that with over 9000 
public libraries nationwide this works out to an average of .22 incidents per location, it is 
uncertain if this level of activity warrants Congressional attention. 
 
 Justice Rehnquist next noted that conditional grant jurisprudence, as outlined in Dole, had 
affirmed the wide latitude given to Congress to impose conditions on the grant of federal 
subsidies, such as the E-rate and LSTA subsidies.183 In the first of a series of defensive responses 
to dissent opinions, Justice Rehnquist argued that Justice Stevens “[m]isapprehends the analysis 
we must perform to determine whether CIPA exceeds Congress’ authority under the Spending 
Clause.”184 The dissent is criticized for focusing on whether Congress had the right to “impose 
[CIPA’s filtering] requirement” on public libraries, instead of “allowing local decisionmakers 
[sic] to tailor their responses to local problems.”185 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the 
appropriate standard was whether the condition Congress required “would…be unconstitutional” 
if performed by the library itself.186
 
 While this is a correct statement of the Dole standard, Justice Rehnquist missed the point 
Justice Stevens was making in the cited reference.  Justice Stevens was pointing out that in 
adopting a standard applicable on a nationwide basis, requiring the use of filtering software that 
has no component recognizing and applying local community standards to the definition of 
“obscene” materials, Congress was ignoring the Court’s prior determination in Miller that local 
communities were best equipped to determine what was, or was not, obscene in their regions.187 
Justice Stevens found a secondary source author who expressed this view in unequivocal terms: 
 
Indeed, federal or state mandates in this area are unnecessary and unwise.  Locally 
designed solutions are likely to best meet local circumstances.  Local decision makers 
                                                          
181 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003). 
182 Id. at 200 (citing Obscene Material Available Via The Internet: Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on 
Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot., 106th Congress, 2d Sess. 1, 27 (2000), (citing D. Burt, Dangerous Access, 
2000 Edition:  Uncovering Internet Pornography in America’s Libraries (2000))). 
183 Id. at 203.  
184 Id. at 203 n.2. 
185 Id., (citing the dissent by Justice Stevens, at 242). 
186 Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987)). 
187 Id. at 223-24 n.3.  
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and library boards, responding to local concerns and the prevalence of the problem in 
their own libraries, should decide if minors’ Internet access requires filters. They are the 
persons in the best position to judge local community standards for what is and is not 
obscene, as required by the Miller [v. California] test.  Indeed, one nationwide solution is 
not needed, as the problems are local and, to some extent, uniquely so. Libraries in rural 
communities, for instance, have reported much less of a problem than libraries in urban 
areas. A library in a rural community with only one or two computers with Internet 
access may find that even the limited filtering advocated here provides little or no 
additional benefit.  Further, by allowing the nation’s public libraries to develop their own 
approaches, they may be able to develop a better understanding of what methods work 
well and what methods add little or nothing, or are even counter-productive.  Imposing a 
mandatory nationwide solution may well impede developing truly effective approaches 
that do not violate the First Amendment.  The federal and state governments can best 
assist this effort by providing libraries with sufficient funding to experiment with a 
variety of constitutionally permissible approaches.188
 
 One of the more troubling aspects of the plurality decision in this case is the total absence 
of any discussion of the effect CIPA’s mandate will have on local community input into 
obscenity analysis.  As the District Court noted, the three principal providers of filtering software 
do not include, in their category definition, or in their mechanical or human website review, any 
consideration of the contemporary community standards of the city or county in whose libraries 
the software will be deployed. The prescient warnings of Justice Douglas in Roth, Justice Warren 
in Jacobellis, and Justice Warren in Miller, that a national standard is not susceptible of 
definition, were ignored by Congress in the enactment of CIPA, and by the plurality in this 
decision.  It remains to be seen whether Santayana’s warning will return to haunt us, and whether 
this refusal to learn from the past will doom us to repeat the mess we have made of obscenity law 
in cyberspace. 
 
 Justice Rehnquist next focused on the issue of whether Internet access at public libraries 
qualifies for strict scrutiny analysis on the theory that in providing this access, the libraries are 
serving as public fora.189 He rejected the District Court finding in the affirmative, holding that 
the principles relied on are “out of place in the context of this case.”190  Citing the Cornelius 
decision, he asserted that “Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a 
‘designated’ public forum.191 Justice Rehnquist noted that since the Internet is a recent 
development, it may not avail itself of the benefit of traditional public forum status, holding:  
“The doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations where 
such history is lacking.”192
                                                          
188 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S.at 223-224 (citing Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards:  The First 
Amendment Implications of the Use of Software Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in Public 
Libraries, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 213, 279 (2003)). 
189 Id. at 205. 
190 Id. at 205. 
191 Id. at 205 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund., Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). 
192 Id. at 205-06 (citing Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)). In Forbes, the Court 
declined to extend public forum principles to a public television station’s editorial judgments regarding the private 
speech it presents to its viewers, noting that extending broad rights of access for outside speakers would be 
antithetical to the discretion the station and its editors would need to exercise as journalists.  The plurality’s reliance 
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 The plurality decision disregarded the District Court’s discussion of the manner in which 
the Internet serves as a public forum for library patrons.  The value provided to patrons by 
allowing them access to chat rooms, Web hosting, and the entire panoply of interactive services 
and contact with speakers all over the world is of no consequence to the Court.  Instead, Justice 
Rehnquist asserted that public libraries do not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a 
public forum for Web publishers, just as public libraries do not acquire books to provide a forum 
for the authors to speak.  Access to the Internet, he argued, is provided by libraries as part of 
their basic function:  “to facilitate research, learning and recreational pursuits by furnishing 
materials of requisite and appropriate quality”.193 Reaching back to a 1999 Congressional report, 
he noted that, “[a]s Congress recognized, ‘the Internet is simply another method for making 
information available in a school or library.’ It is ‘no more than a technological extension of the 
book stack.’”194  
 
 To contemporary ears, the assertion by a the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
speaking for a plurality of the Court, that the Internet is nothing more than a technological stack 
of books is both shocking and deeply disappointing.  It simultaneously disregards and affirms the 
concerns voiced by Professor Lawrence Lessig in his seminal works, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace195and The Future of Ideas196 that the promise of the Internet to function as a 
contemporary “commons” for the unrestricted (or at least relatively so) communication and 
development of ideas, as had been afforded by traditional public forums in the past might not be 
met, if over-regulation was to be its fate.197 As Professor Lessig put it: 
 
My central claim throughout is that there is a benefit to resources held in common and 
that the Internet is the best evidence of that benefit.  As we will see, the Internet forms an 
innovation commons. It forms this commons not just through norms, but also through a 
specific technical architecture.  The Net of these norms and this architecture is a space 
where creativity can flourish.  Yet so blind are we to the possible value of a commons 
that we don’t even notice the commons that the Internet is. And, in turn, this blindness 
leads us to ignore changes to the norms and architecture of the Net that will weaken this 
commons.  There is a tragedy of the commons that we will identify here; it is the tragedy 
of losing the innovation commons that the Internet is, through the changes that are being 
rendered on top.198
 
 The blocking and filtering software CIPA mandates is an example of the regulation of the 
Internet by architecture, or code, which is likely, over time, to adversely affect creativity and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on Forbes seems misplaced in the context of public libraries provision of Internet access for patrons.  The library 
staff is not responsible for the content of the Internet, and no journalistic principles are involved.  Moreover, once 
again the fact that the Court sees television as a medium comparable to the Internet highlights how little appreciation 
or understanding the Court seems to have for the unique interactive nature of the Internet, and how that interactivity 
is central to the public forum function it offers users. 
193 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S.at 206, (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S.at 834; Cornelius, 473 U.S at 805). 
194 Id. at 207; S. Rep. No. 104-141, at 7 n.3. 
195 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). 
196 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001). 
197 Code, supra note 183, at 213-221;  Future, supra note 184, at 19-25. 
198 Future, supra note 184 at 23. 
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communication.  It is particularly unfortunate that this restriction will likely do the greatest harm 
to the segment of the population that is economically disadvantaged.  
 
 Justice Rehnquist next considered another aspect of the purpose of public libraries in 
providing Internet access, which he viewed as further evidence that public forum doctrine did not 
apply.  He adopted the government argument, rejected by the District Court, that in offering 
access to the Internet to patrons, public libraries are simply offering patrons another form of 
book in the libraries collection. As he put it: 
 
But this mistakes a public library’s purpose for acquiring Internet terminals: A library 
does so to provide its patrons with materials of requisite and appropriate quality, not to 
create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves. …A library’s decision to 
use filtering software is a collection decision, not a restraint on private speech.199
 
 The assertion that libraries do not provide Internet access to create a public forum for 
Web publishers misses the point – a significant benefit libraries grant their patrons in providing 
Internet access is the ability of the patrons to interact with other speakers online, as well as to 
partake of the views of those speakers.  Again, the Court seemed either intent on disregarding, or 
unaware of, what is probably the most significant value of the Internet – its dynamic 
interactivity.  The qualities Justice Rehnquist ascribed to the Internet are more appropriately 
descriptive of CD-ROM storage media, and not the Internet. 
 
 The concept that acquiring Internet terminals is a “collection decision” is also flawed, and 
reveals another misapprehension about the nature of the Internet and Web sites and pages.  In his 
dissent, Justice Souter succinctly challenged the merit of this concept: 
 
At every significant point, however, the Internet blocking here defies comparison to the 
process of acquisition.  Whereas traditional scarcity of money and space require a library 
to make choices about what to acquire, and the choice to be made is whether or not to 
spend the money to acquire something, blocking is the subject of a choice made after the 
money for Internet access has been spend or committed.  Since it makes no difference to 
the cost of Internet access whether an adult calls up material harmful for children or the 
Articles of Confederation, blocking (on facts like these) is not necessitated by scarcity of 
either money or space….The proper analogy therefore is not to passing up a book that 
might have been bought;  it is either to buying a book and then keeping it from adults 
lacking an acceptable “purpose,” or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages 
with anything thought to be unsuitable for all adults.200
 
 Justice Souter’s argument, powerful as it is, in fact does not go far enough in describing 
the effect of the deployment of filtering software under CIPA – in fact it is not as though the 
library bought an encyclopedia and cut out allegedly unsuitable pages – given the “root URL” 
filtering methodology used, it is more akin to the library buying an encyclopedia and removing 
the S and P volumes, because “sex” and “pornography” are discussed in those volumes – 
sacrificing all of the other “s” or “p” entries in the process. 
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200 Id. at 236. 
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 If we remove the Internet component from the discussion, the conditional grant argument 
becomes harder to make given First Amendment protections – can the government, for example, 
condition subsidies provided to libraries for building expenses on the libraries agreeing not to 
provide patrons with copies of Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, or Margaret Mitchell’s Gone 
With the Wind, on the grounds that their portrayal of African-Americans is racist, or romance 
novels, on the grounds that the portrayal of women is sexist; and in both cases, that the works are 
therefore harmful to minors?  The government argument in favor of this kind of conduct would 
again be that it was not preventing libraries from acquiring these works – just denying subsidies 
to those libraries that do make those selections.  The issue here is that by targeting a particular 
type of speech, the statute is content-based, which invites strict scrutiny, and distinguishes this 
case from Finley or Rust, where the limitations at issue were not directed to a particular category 
of speech. 
 
 In a similar vein, the plurality opinion asserted, without any supporting authority, that 
libraries do not include “pornography” in their other collections, so there should be no basis for 
objecting to a government program that supports that practice regarding Internet access.201 
Putting aside the questionable assumption that providing Internet access is the same thing as 
adding another book to the libraries’ collection, this assumption is, with respect to the works 
found in many libraries, debatable if not simply incorrect.  It is likely that many citizens, shown 
copies of explicit gay pulp novels or Robert Mapplethorpe photography books found in the 
collections of libraries in San Francisco or New York City might disagree with the statement that 
libraries do not include “pornography” in their collections.  Rather, it is accurate to say that the 
collections of libraries across the country reflect the contemporary community standards of the 
city or county in which they are located – and that the extent of regulation they attach to Internet 
access provided to their patrons should similarly be reflective of those standards – and not a 
national standard mandated by the federal government, and implemented by private industry 
software companies. 
 
 The final area in which the plurality opinion revealed its lack of understanding of how 
software filters will work under CIPA is in its discussion of the effect of the “disabling 
provision” of the Act.  Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
 
Assuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional difficulties, any such 
concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software 
disabled….The Solicitor General confirmed that a “librarian can, in response from a 
person, unblock the filtering mechanism altogether.”202 He further explained that a patron 
would not “have to explain…why he was asking a site to be unblocked or the filtering to 
be disabled.,”203 The District Court viewed unblocking and disabling as inadequate 
because some patrons may be too embarrassed to request them. (citation omitted). But the 
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Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library 
without any risk of embarrassment.204
 
 This understanding of the viability of the disabling provision under CIPA was the key 
basis for the support the plurality obtained from Justices Kennedy and Breyer in their concurring 
opinions.  Justice Kennedy’s entire view of the case was colored by what he understood was the 
ease of implementation of this disabling provision: “If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian 
will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant delay, 
there is little to this case.  The [g]overnment represents this is indeed the fact.”205
 
Justice Breyer also found that the disabling provision provided significant relief from the 
potential interference with the constitutional rights of library patrons: 
 
As the plurality points out, the Act allows libraries to permit any adult patron access to an 
“overblocked” Web site; the adult patron need only ask a librarian to unblock the specific 
Web site or, alternatively, ask the librarian, “Please disable the entire filter”. 
…. 
The Act does impose upon the patron the burden of making this request.  But it is 
difficult to see how that burden (or any delay associated with compliance) could prove 
more onerous than traditional library practices associated with segregating library 
materials in say, closed stacks, or with interlibrary lending practices that require patrons 
to make requests that are not anonymous and to wait while the librarian obtains the 
desired materials from elsewhere. 
…. 
Given the comparatively small burden that the Act imposes upon the library patron 
seeking legitimate Internet materials, I cannot say that any speech-related harm that the 
Act may cause is disproportionate when considered in relation to the Act’s legitimate 
objectives.206
 
The plurality’s analysis of the mechanics of the “disabling provision” is flawed in several 
respects.  The first is the failure of the Court to consider the substantial logistical burdens the 
disabling provision imposes on libraries and their staff.  In order to be able to respond to patrons’ 
request for unblocking pages, sites or the entire filter, the library will need to have staff on duty 
at all times who are familiar with the software, and are able to disable it.  Library staff will also 
have to keep up with the frequent updates this software, like most software, requires – incurring 
                                                          
204 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 209.  In a footnote following this statement, Justice Rehnquist notes that the 
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206 Id. at 219-220. 
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both the cost of purchasing updates and the training required of staff to install and run the 
software.  Further, each unblocking request, once implemented, requires follow-up by staff to re-
install the filter before the next patron uses the computer.  In a busy urban library, with 20 or 
more computers located in different parts of the library, the responsibility of keeping track of 
which computer has had filtering disabled, on a single page, a single site, or the entire filter, is a 
daunting logistical nightmare.  The consequences of failure are also severe, since a library that 
knowingly fails to maintain the filters in place, despite having certified compliance, can be 
compelled to reimburse the government for any subsidies it received.207
 
A second flaw in the disabling provision is that it assumes that the library patron will 
know what is on the site or page which is blocked, and will therefore be able to identify for the 
librarian which page or site is to be unblocked.  There is no certainty that the process will be 
handled this easily.  To the extent sites are blocked, particularly if the blocking is done by “root 
URL”, the patron may not be able to tell whether the site contains pages that the patron needs or 
wants to view, or not.  A patron who is doing research in an area subject to significant filtering, 
ie: child pornography, may find that every site and page is blocked, and research will quickly 
become impossible unless the entire filter is disabled.  Justice Stevens highlighted this problem 
in his dissent: 
 
Until a blocked site or group of sites is unblocked, a patron is unlikely to know what is 
being hidden and therefore whether there is any point in asking for the filter to be 
removed. It is as though the statute required a significant part of every library’s reading 
materials to be kept in unmarked, locked rooms or cabinets, which could be opened only 
in response to specific requests.  Some curious readers would in time obtain access to the 
hidden materials, but many would not….Moreover, because the procedures that different 
libraries are likely to adopt to respond to unblocking requests will no doubt vary, it is 
impossible to measure the aggregate effect of the statute on patrons’ access to blocked 
sites.  Unless we assume that the statute is a mere symbolic gesture, we must conclude 
that it will create a significant prior restraint on adult access to protected speech.208
 
The third flaw in the plurality’s reliance on the disabling provision of the Act is that 
contrary to the assurances offered by the Solicitor General in oral argument before the Court, the 
Act does not allow the wholesale disabling of filters without any reason – the mere request of a 
patron is not sufficient under the Act, which instead reposes discretion in the library staff to 
accede to a patron’s request, upon a showing that the patron is engaged in “bona fide research” - 
which is undefined in the statute - or for “other legal purposes” -again undefined.209
 
                                                          
207 Children’s Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (F)(ii).  Libraries that simply fail to comply may not be 
compelled to reimburse funds, but may be denied future subsidies, and may be forced to comply through the 
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Finally, since the stated purpose of the Act is “[t]o protect America’s children from 
exposure to obscene material, child pornography, or other material deemed inappropriate for 
minors while accessing the Internet from a school or library…”,210there appears to be no reason, 
related to that purpose, for requiring that all computers in the library, whether acquired or 
operated with the use of federal funds or not, be equipped with filters if any federal subsidies are 
received – including computers operated by staff and never available to patrons.  The First 
Amendment overbreadth considerations that motivated the District Court to find the Act facially 
invalid would be eliminated if the Act was narrower in scope – for example if it required public 
libraries to maintain computers dedicated to use by minors only, and which were therefore 
required to apply filters, while leaving libraries to their own discretion as to the regulation 
methodology to employ for adult Internet use.  Justice Souter was critical of the government’s 
distrust of adults and library staff in his dissenting opinion: 
 
The statute could, in other words, have protected children without blocking access for 
adults or subjecting adults to anything more than minimal inconvenience, just the way 
(the record shows) many librarians had been dealing with obscenity and indecency before 
imposition of federal conditions (citation omitted). Instead, the [g]overnment’s funding 
conditions engage in overkill to a degree illustrated by their refusal to trust even a 
library’s staff with an unblocked terminal, one to which the adult public itself has no 
access. (citation omitted).  
 
The question for me, then, is whether a local library could itself constitutionally impose 
these restrictions on the content otherwise available to an adult patron through an Internet 
connection, at a library terminal provided for public use.  The answer is no….This would 
simply be censorship…(a)s to those who did not qualify for discretionary unblocking, the 
censorship would be complete and, like all censorship by an agency of the [g]overnment, 
presumptively invalid owing to strict scrutiny in implementing the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment.211
 
These arguments, strong as they may seem, and amply supported by the extensive 
findings of fact in the District Court proceeding, were not persuasive to the plurality, and were 
not enough to dissuade Justices Kennedy and Breyer from their mistaken view that the disabling 
provision offered an adequate safeguard against the defects of the filtering process. But for 
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer’s misapprehension that CIPA’s disabling provision rendered 
the over- and underblocking of protected expression an insignificant burden to the First 
Amendment rights of library patrons, it appears that there would not have been a majority found 
to support the Act.  Given their support however, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, 
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211 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 234-35. Justice Stevens, in his separate dissent, echoed this lack of trust concern:  
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reaching aspect of the Act is passed over without comment by the plurality opinion. 
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found that CIPA did not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, and was a valid exercise of 
Congress’ spending power, mandating the reversal of the District Court’s decision.212
 
In addition to the responsive arguments previously analyzed, Justice Stevens’ dissent also 
takes aim at the plurality’s support of the government view that CIPA does not penalize libraries 
that do not employ filtering software – it just conditions the grant of federal funds on the use of 
this software. In Justice Steven’s view, this is a bit of sophistry that will not pass muster:  “An 
abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of benefits can be just as pernicious as an 
abridgment by means of a threatened penalty”.213
 
Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, offered the best summary of the error and the 
consequence of the approach taken by the plurality: 
 
There is no good reason, then, to treat blocking of adult enquiry as anything different 
from the censorship it presumptively is.  For this reason, I would hold in accordance with 
conventional strict scrutiny that a library’s practice of blocking would violate an adult 
patron’s First and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of Internet censorship, when 
unjustified (as here) by any legitimate interest in screening children from harmful 
material.214
 
 However compelling the views of the dissenters may be, the fog had returned to the 
coastline, and libraries across the nation were left, in the wake of this plurality opinion, with the 
question of how to implement a statute most strongly believed would cause them to violate the 
First Amendment rights of their patrons.   
 
V. Clear Skies Peeking Through the Fog?  The Library Community 
Reaction to American Library Ass’n v. U.S.  
 
 Reaction by public libraries to the decision in American Library Ass’n v. U.S. has fallen 
into three categories: full compliance, interpretive compliance, and refusal to comply. Libraries 
that are in full compliance are those that have continued to accept federal subsidies, and have 
installed filtering and blocking software systems on every computer in their library, and only 
disable those filters upon request of adult patrons, for bona fide research  projects or other lawful 
reasons.  Once disabled, filters are re-enabled for the next patron. 
 
 While there does not appear to be any comprehensive study presently available to 
indicate the rate of full compliance among the nations’ public libraries, anecdotal evidence and a 
small study of libraries taken shortly after the Supreme Court decision suggests that 
approximately 60-70% of the libraries in the nation are in full compliance.215A significant factor 
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214 Id. at 242. 
215 A unscientific (data was collected through a Google search of local newspaper coverage of CIPA) survey of 25 
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in the decision to fully comply seems to be the loss of funding resulting from a refusal to 
comply.  The Free Library of Philadelphia, for example, is fully complying, presumably in part 
so it could retain the $200,000 in federal fund subsidies it receives.216 What is interesting from 
this small study is that the cost of implementing the filters is often equal to the subsidy benefit 
retained.  In at least one case, the financial equation is upside down.  The San Antonio Public 
Library system in Texas estimated that it would lose $30,000 in federal funding if it chose not to 
comply with CIPA, however it also estimated that the cost of licensing and maintaining the 
software would be $35,000, and that it would also incur up to $500,000 in additional staff costs 
to hire staff for managing the filter systems.217
 The second category of response, what I call interpretive compliance, refers to an 
interesting response to CIPA, following the Supreme Court decision.  In its press release 
immediately following the announcement of the Court’s decision, the President of the ALA and 
the Executive Board of the Association asserted that the decision meant:  “The law is 
constitutional only if the mandated filters can be disabled upon the request of adult library users.  
Users do not have to explain why they are making the request.”218  
 
 This interpretation of the decision is based on the plurality’s reliance on the advice of the 
Solicitor General, which was relied on by the plurality, and by concurring Justices Kennedy and 
Breyer, as has been discussed, supra.219Based on the field reports compiled by the ALA, it 
appears to be the basis of the approach taken by one New York library, where adult patrons, after 
certifying their adult status, may instruct the library as to whether they wish to have filters turned 
on or off, and their preference is saved in the library computer system, and automatically 
triggered each time they log on, without any further involvement of library staff.220
 
 This interpretive compliance may also skew the results of any survey of CIPA 
compliance. Even though the statute mandates that the filters remain on for adult patrons and 
may only be removed by library staff, the comments by the plurality and Justices Kennedy and 
Breyer seem to be providing a basis for libraries to interpret the decision as is essence rewriting 
and expanding the disabling provision of the law to allow adult patrons to elect to disable the 
filters on their own. Hence, we find an article by the Director of the Carroll County (Maryland) 
Public Library discussing the decision of the library, which had previously used voluntary 
filtering of its Internet access, to continue the practice under CIPA:  “With the CIPA ruling I 
think the basic filter will remain throughout the system.  Adult patrons can choose to turn off the 
filter for their entire session, but the filter will automatically resume at the start of the next 
session.”221 This interpretive compliance allows public libraries to accept E-rate and LSTA 
subsidies by installing filters and either allowing them to be disabled by adult patrons at their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
extrapolated from the listings under the heading ALA CIPA and Libraries From the Field, last updated 15 July 2005, 
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discretion, or by allowing staff to disable them upon patron request, without requiring any 
explanation for the request.222
 
 The final category of response, those public libraries that have chosen to do without 
federal subsidy in order to provide unfiltered Internet access to their patrons, is in some instances 
marked by a significant financial sacrifice.  In a 2003 article, San Francisco City Librarian Susan 
Hildreth estimated that the City’s enactment of an ordinance banning the use of filters for any 
public access computer within the city limits would cost the public library $225, 000 in lost E-
rate subsidies. 223 If the assumption previously made, that approximately 40% of the nation’s 
public libraries are going without this funding, the losses resulting from the affirmance of CIPA 
are in excess of several million dollars nationwide. 
 
 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, noted that the plurality’s reversal of the 
District Court did not rule out an as-applied challenge to CIPA:   
 
If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock specific Web sites or to disable a 
filter or if it is shown that an adult user’s election to view constitutionally protected 
Internet material is burdened in some other substantial way, that would be the subject for 
an as-applied challenge, not the facial challenge made in this case.224
 
It has, as of this writing, been over two years since the Supreme Court decision was 
published.  To date, there have been no as-applied challenges filed against CIPA.  The reasons 
for this absence of filings, one can assume, are varied.  Mounting a challenge to a federal statute, 
for an individual, is a daunting prospect.  National organizations have little to gain in supporting 
such a challenge, since its effect, even if successful, would be limited in scope to the particular 
jurisdiction in which the action was filed.  The interpretive compliance approach taken by many 
libraries has rendered CIPA somewhat toothless for libraries that allow adult patrons to disable 
the filters themselves, or allow staff to disable the filter with no questions asked. Those libraries 
that have declined the subsidies have also removed themselves from the possibility of mounting 
an as-applied challenge. It would appear that libraries have figured out ways to find a patch of 




 Following the District Court’s decision invalidating the Children’s Internet Protection 
Act, critics of Congress’ efforts to limit access or regulate content on the Internet had reason to 
celebrate – it appeared that sunlight had finally cut through the fog of judicial and legislative 
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efforts to regulate online content and interaction among adults.  The Supreme Court decision, 
marked by a singular failure to learn from its own prior obscenity case jurisprudence and a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the workings of the Internet, fulfilled Dickens’ dark vision 
of the courts as the locus for the murkiest fog in the nation.  The resiliency and adaptability of 
our public libraries to this regrettable decision allows a little sunshine to peek through those 
clouds, and fortifies us for the day when a different Congress and/or Supreme Court once again 
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